

THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

*Dedicated to The Immaculate Heart of
The Blessed Virgin Mary
Mother of Eternal Wisdom*

The Rhetoric of Aristotle

How to discover
the means of persuasion
for any subject

Bernard Sadler

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7 Kambora Ave
Frenchs Forest, NSW 2086
Australia

bernsadler@outlook.com

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Introduction

Simply stating an idea is seldom enough to get it accepted by others. Truth is not always self-evident, as can be seen from the multitude of conflicting ideas held on most subjects. The acceptance of ideas often depends not so much on the ideas themselves as on their proponents' ability to persuade others of their truth. If we want others to understand and accept our ideas, we must persuade them.

It is the same with practical matters. What should be done is not always obvious, and often enough the best course of action is decided upon only after counsel and debate. In a free society, if we want others to adopt our advice, we must persuade them.

There are three methods we can use to reason and argue—science, dialectic and rhetoric. Which method we should use on a particular occasion depends on the circumstances.

Science, or demonstration, is the surest method but the least often available. The subject being discussed must fall under some particular science, the speaker and the listener both must understand that science and both must be skilled at scientific reasoning.

Dialectic is the method to use when the others do not understand the relevant science or when the matter being discussed does not fall under any science. Dialectic argues from generally accepted opinions understood by all rather than from particular scientific principles understood by few, so it can be used for discussing any subject with anyone—provided they are skilled enough at reasoning.

When the listeners are unskilled at reasoning, the best method to use for arguing with them and persuading them is rhetoric.

Everyone has some ability to propose or to criticize arguments, to defend themselves or to accuse others. Some do this well by natural ability, others by practice, but most speakers argue at random; they have no system to help them prepare, and they say whatever just comes to mind. And since they speak at random, any success they have must be random too.

Persuasion is less random if speakers use a system to prepare what they are going to say. While no system will *guarantee* them success, a good system will help them discover what is most likely to persuade their listeners and give them a *greater chance* of success. The very best system ever devised for discovering what is likely to persuade listeners is contained in a book called *The Art of Rhetoric*.

The author of this work, Aristotle of Stagira, was one of the most brilliant thinkers the world has known. He was born in Macedon in 384 B.C., the son of the court physician, Nichomachus. When he was eighteen he went to Athens and studied for twenty years under Plato. He was such an outstanding student that Plato called him “the mind of the school”. In 343 he returned to Macedon and became tutor to Alexander the Great, then thirteen years old. When Alexander succeeded to his father's throne in 336, Aristotle went again to Athens and set up a school of his own. Political upheavals forced him to leave Athens in 323 and the following year he died.

Aristotle left the world a treasury of works on a great variety of philosophical, scientific and political subjects. Many of them continue to be studied widely after more than two thousand years. Not the least renowned is this famous treatise on persuasive speaking, written at Athens about 330 B.C. One of several books he wrote on the subject, it is the only one to survive.

Even in the best translations, the text of *The Art of Rhetoric* is difficult to use. Like any author, Aristotle had to make assumptions about what his readers already understood and what he would have to explain. Not all his assumptions are valid for modern readers. Some guidance is needed today. Moreover, the typography and layout that modern readers have come to rely on were not available to Aristotle or his editors. Finding one's way around his works without getting lost in the detail is a challenge of its own.

Readers unfamiliar with *The Art of Rhetoric* may be surprised at its content. Many people think of rhetoric as a literary subject concerned with ornate language for public speaking. Aristotle's rhetoric is not that—it is closer to dialectic, ethics and psychology than to literature. While it considers the influence of language on listeners, it does so only insofar as language is one of the several factors that contribute to persuasion.

Further, rhetoric is not just for *public* speaking. It certainly is used for speaking publicly to large crowds but it can also be used for speaking privately to a single listener. Neither is it limited to *speaking*. With appropriate modifications to style, it is just as useful for writing. Whenever anyone has to be persuaded, rhetoric can be used.

The present book is not offered as a new translation of *The Art of Rhetoric*, nor as an exhaustive study of the subject. It is more of an introductory paraphrase. Its purpose is to provide a simplified restatement of the original that is accessible, readily understandable and practical. Although the text basically follows Aristotle's plan and much of his wording is retained, some rearrangement has been made and additional explanations have been incorporated where they seemed necessary. As far as practicable, these additional explanations have been taken from Aristotle's other works, or from authors in his tradition. Many details have been omitted to simplify study, reducing the bulk of the text to a little over half.

After getting an idea of how Aristotle's treatment is structured and how his system works, readers should refer to any of the several complete editions available to benefit from the richness of his full text.

PART 1 – DISCOVERY OF LOGICAL PROOF

1 Rhetoric

Rhetoric is the art of discovering the available means of persuasion in any subject of discussion.

Rhetoric is called an art because it provides systematic rules for achieving what we intend—discovering what is likely to persuade our listeners.

It can be used for any subject of discussion because it produces arguments based on generally accepted opinions rather than on the special knowledge of this or that particular science.

It can be used with any listeners, both because it is based on opinions that most people hold, and because it always assumes that the listeners are unskilled at reasoning, that is, they are unable to take a general view of many stages or follow a long chain of arguments in the subject being discussed.

Consequently, rhetoric will not produce scientific certainty on any question. But no one requires or expects that degree of certainty in everyday affairs. We are satisfied if the decisions we come to are true in most cases, that is, if they are *probably* true.

From this we can see that rhetoric cannot guarantee to persuade. In this it is no different to other arts. Medicine, for example, does not undertake to cure patients. Rather, it promotes their cure as far as possible—even incurables can be treated properly. Likewise, rhetoric helps speakers discover whatever is likely to persuade their listeners so that, like the physician, they will succeed as far as possible.

Further, because we are dealing with probabilities rather than with certainties, we can use rhetoric to argue for either side of a case and use it to support or oppose the same proposal. Not that we should do so indifferently and persuade others of what is false or wrong, for that would be immoral; but by doing so we can gain a better understanding of the case and prepare to counteract false arguments if our opponents make unfair use of them.

If from this it is objected that rhetoric can be used to promote false and misleading ideas and thereby do a great deal of harm, we should reply that this objection applies to every good thing except virtue, and especially to the very things that are most useful, such as strength and wealth. Wrongly used they may do the greatest harm, but rightly used they may do the greatest good.

Besides, since the use of rhetoric is available for supporting either side, it would be foolish to forbid its use to the proponents of right and allow its use by the proponents of wrong. The true and the just are naturally superior to their opposites, so if the false and the unjust prevail over them their defeat must be due to the failure of their advocates, and that is reprehensible.

Kinds of rhetoric

There are three kinds of rhetoric corresponding to the three kinds of listeners. The listener is necessarily either required to make a decision or not. If he is not required to make a decision, he is just an onlooker. If he is required to make a decision, it will be about things past or about things to come. Members of a deliberative assembly are required to make decisions about the future; members of a trial jury are required to make decisions about the past. The onlooker merely judges the ability of the speaker. Therefore there are three kinds of rhetoric: deliberative rhetoric, judicial rhetoric and display rhetoric. All three kinds of rhetoric may be used in the one speech, but depending on the occasion or the purpose of the speech, one kind will predominate.

Deliberative rhetoric is for persuading and dissuading. It is used by managers and politicians and all those who deliberate and exhort about things to come.

Judicial rhetoric is for accusing and defending. It is used by those who argue in courts of law or by anyone else who has to accuse others or defend others or himself against charges of wrongdoing committed in the past.

Display rhetoric is for praising and blaming. It is used especially on social and on ceremonial occasions for speeches of introduction, farewell, congratulation, commendation, and the like, in which someone's excellence is spoken of, or displayed. It is also used when someone wishes simply to display his own skill in speaking. Display rhetoric is usually concerned with the present time, but it is not unusual for display speakers to recall past events and anticipate things of the future.

Each of the three kinds of rhetoric has its own special end. The end of the deliberative speaker is the expedient and the harmful. The speaker who persuades urges a course of action as the more useful, and the speaker who dissuades urges that it is less useful or harmful. Any other consideration, such as its justice or injustice, its honour or dishonour will be included only as secondary to expediency.

The end of the judicial speaker is the just and the unjust. As in deliberative speaking, all other considerations are included only as incidental.

The end of display speaking is the noble and the disgraceful. All other considerations are referred to these.

That these ends are correctly assigned can be seen from the fact that speakers will not argue about the other points. For example, the accused does not always deny that he committed an action or that he inflicted an injury, but he will never admit that his actions were unjust. If he did that there would be no need for a trial.

Likewise, the deliberative speaker will never admit that the course of action he is recommending is useless, or that what he is speaking against is useful. Often enough, however, he will ignore the fact that his recommendation is dishonourable or that it will cause an injustice to a third party.

Again, the speaker who praises or blames someone does not consider whether what he did was expedient or harmful. Rather, he will praise him precisely because he

disregarded his own interests and performed some honourable deed—for example, that he put his own life in danger in order to save someone else. Putting his own life in danger is very inexpedient; saving someone else's life is noble.

Means of persuasion

The means of persuasion used in rhetoric are three: proof, style and arrangement. Each contributes in its own way to the speaker's persuasiveness.

Style makes a speech persuasive by making it pleasant. Listeners are more attentive to speech that pleases them, and when they pay more attention they are more easily persuaded. We will consider style in Part 3.

Arrangement makes a speech persuasive by giving it good order. It helps the speaker decide what things must be spoken of, and it helps him present them to his listeners in a sequence they can easily follow. We will consider arrangement in Part 4.

Proof makes a speech persuasive by removing doubts that the listeners may have. Proof is the most important means of persuasion because listeners are most strongly persuaded when they think something has been proved. We will consider proofs and how to find them in the remainder of Part 1 and in Part 2. Just what must be proved in each kind of rhetoric is considered in Part 4.

Proof

In rhetoric, proof is something that gives the listeners confidence in what the speaker says.

Some proofs are real, or ready-made—the speaker simply uses them. A written contract is an example. Other proofs have to be invented, or discovered. Discovery of proofs is the main work of rhetoric.

Of invented proofs, there are three kinds: *moral* proof, *emotional* proof and *logical* proof. All three may be used in the one speech, but not at the same time. These three kinds of proofs correspond to the three things the speaker may use to dispel the listeners' doubts and gain their confidence: the speaker's own moral character, the listeners' state of mind, and the truth, or apparent truth, of what the speaker says.

The speaker uses *moral* proof to persuade his listeners when he relies on the impression they get of his moral worth. Listeners are confident in a worthy person at any time, but the more doubt they themselves have about the matter being spoken of, the more readily and the more fully will they have confidence in a speaker who appears trustworthy to them. The speaker conveys the impression of trustworthiness mainly by the manner in which he delivers his speech.

The speaker uses *emotional* proof to persuade his listeners when he relies on their emotional state of mind to affect their judgement about something. When people are affected by an emotion they make their judgments in accordance with that emotion. So, if listeners are made to feel afraid, they will more readily believe whatever people usually believe when they are afraid—that flight would be useful, for example. If listeners are made to feel friendship for someone, they will more readily believe

whatever people usually believe about their friends—that they should be helped, for example. Similarly in respect to the other emotions. The speaker arouses the required emotion by referring to the listeners themselves and to things likely to affect them in some way. We will consider moral proof and emotional proof in Part 2.

The speaker uses *logical* proof to persuade his listeners when he relies on them seeing the logical connection between what he is saying and other things they already believe to be true. When they see the logical connection, they transfer the confidence they have in those things to whatever the speaker connects to them.

Since these are the kinds of proofs used, the student of rhetoric has to be capable of logical reasoning and capable of understanding characters, virtues and emotions—their nature and origin and how each is produced.

2 Logical proof

Logical proof is speech that makes the statement to be proved clearer and more credible. The proof may be a single statement or it may be several statements. Just as the rational sciences use two kinds of reasoning: induction and syllogism, so rhetoric uses two corresponding kinds of logical arguments: example and enthymeme.

Induction

An induction is a logical argument in which a less credible statement about all or none of something is supported by more credible statements about many or all particular cases included in that kind of thing. What applies to the particular cases cited is shown to apply generally to every case.

In rhetoric, the equivalent kind of inductive reasoning is called example.

Example

An example is a logical argument, like an induction, in which a less credible statement about one particular case is supported by a more credible statement about another and better known particular case of the same kind. There are three kinds of examples: historical examples, comparisons and stories.

Historical examples

An historical example is a past event taken from real life. An argument from an historical example might go something like this:

Our President is trying to make himself a dictator—he has asked for a private body-guard. Remember how the President of Uragania asked for a body-guard, and as soon as he got it he made himself dictator.

To construct this kind of logical argument:

1. Make the assertion about the particular case being discussed.
2. Add the reason for believing the assertion to be true.
3. Support the reason by referring to one or more better known particular cases of which the assertion and the reason are known to be true by the listeners.

Comparisons

A comparison is a kind of example which uses an imaginary but credible particular case for a proof. An illustration of the use of a comparison to prove something is the argument that seniority should not be used as the basis of selecting a leader, any more than it should be used to select an athlete for the Olympic games. The basis for the selection should be ability.

To construct an argument from a comparison:

1. Make the assertion about the particular case being discussed.
2. Compare it to an imaginary, credible, particular case.
3. Add the reason for believing both cases to be true.

Parables and fables

The third kind of example is the imaginary story. It may be a credible story about people, and then it is called a *parable*; or it may be an incredible story about people, animals or lifeless things, and then it is called a *fable*. The parables of Jesus and the fables of Aesop are well known stories used as proofs.

Here is an instance of a fable being used to persuade. A leader was trying to persuade his followers to keep working with enthusiasm despite difficult conditions, so he told them this story.

A frog had been enjoying itself exploring a dairy when it fell into a pail of cream and was unable to climb or jump out. So it did the only thing it could do in the circumstances—it swam. After swimming for a very long time it was close to exhaustion and in danger of drowning, but it refused to give in—it kept swimming. Then suddenly, an amazing thing happened. It found itself sitting safe and sound on top of a pail of butter.

We must do as the frog did. Even though things look bad, if we keep struggling and refuse to give in, circumstances may change and we will have survived the danger.

To invent a parable or fable, use a framework like this:

Beginning—set the scene

Complication—difficulties arise

Crisis—a choice must be made or action taken

Outcome—consequences of the choice or action are shown

To construct an argument from a story:

1. Tell the parable or fable.
2. Make the assertion about the particular case being discussed.
3. Add the reason for making the assertion, as illustrated by the story.

Syllogism

A syllogism is a logical argument in which the statement to be proved is supported by other statements that are assumed to be true. The supporting statements are called premises and the supported statement is called the conclusion. The argument is so constructed that if the listeners accept the premises, they are compelled by reason to accept the conclusion.

Here is an example of a syllogism:

*Cars with faulty brakes are dangerous,
That car has faulty brakes,
Therefore that car is dangerous.*

The simple assertion that the car is dangerous may be doubted by the listeners but when the speaker adds credible proof statements, the conclusion becomes credible.

Enthymeme

Syllogistic reasoning requires that every step in the argument be stated explicitly so that the necessity of the conclusion can be seen, but rhetorical reasoning does not. If anything is well known to the listeners there is no need to mention it; they will supply it for themselves. So a rhetorical argument will often consist of only a conclusion and a single proof statement.

That car is dangerous; it has faulty brakes.

Most people know that a car with faulty brakes is dangerous, so there is no need to state it. In rhetoric, this kind of syllogistic reasoning is called an enthymeme. The proof statement used in an enthymeme is either a sign or a probability.

Probability

A probability is a statement about all or none of something, referring to what is generally known to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be. It does not have to be true without exception.

Here is an example of an enthymeme from a probability:

He is strong; all athletes are strong.

A probability can be a negative statement:

He is not a unionist; no manager joins a union.

Because they are about all or none of something, probabilities can be used to prove conclusions that are themselves about all or none of something:

All politicians watch public opinion; every elected person does.

Sign

A sign is a statement about something that is easily perceived and which points to something else. Smoke is a sign of fire, and an inoculation is a sign of immunity to a disease, so we can use these signs to make the enthymemes:

*That house is on fire; it has smoke coming out of its windows. And,
He is immune to cholera; he's been inoculated.*

Because signs are about individual things they can be used to prove statements that are about individual things only, like "He is ill" and "That car is not safe". They cannot be used to prove conclusions about all or none of something. So this kind of enthymeme is false:

All cars of this model are dangerous; mine had faulty brakes from new.

Some signs *precede* the things they signify, as a falling barometer precedes the bad weather. Some signs *accompany* the things they signify, as smoke accompanies fire. Some signs *follow* the things they signify, as ashes follow fire. So signs can be used to argue about things future, present and past.

A sign may be the *cause* of the thing it signifies, as an inoculation is the cause of the immunity; or it may be an *effect* of the thing it signifies, as smoke is an effect of fire; or it may *proceed from the same cause* as the thing it signifies, as a falling barometer and bad weather both proceed from a drop in atmospheric pressure. By signifying its cause, the falling barometer also signifies the other effects that follow from the same cause.

An especially useful kind of sign is the *necessary sign*, or clincher, which puts the argument beyond question. For instance, if I argue, “He is ill; he is breathing heavily”, my argument can be questioned because heavy breathing can come from other things—exertion or fear, for instance. The statement is not necessarily true, so heavy breathing is not a necessary sign of illness.

But if I argue, “He is ill; he has a fever”, my argument cannot be questioned. If in fact he has a fever, he is ill because illness is the only cause of a fever. The statement is necessarily true. Fever is a necessary sign of illness.

So the difference between ordinary signs and necessary signs is that ordinary signs can flow from and point to several possible causes, while a necessary sign can flow from and point to one cause only.

Choosing which proof

If a speaker has enthymemes, he should use them. But if he has no enthymemes, he must use examples as his logical proof. Enthymemes are no more persuasive than examples, but listeners enjoy them more.

Examples are especially useful when arguing about the future, because past events are better known than future events, and we believe that if it happened this way in the past it will happen the same way in the future. As a general rule, the future resembles the past.

An example can also be used with an enthymeme as further evidence, as it were, added after the enthymeme as a kind of witness.

3 Discovering proofs

To be ready to speak, the rhetorician must be ready with propositions about what is expedient and harmful, what is just and unjust, and what is honourable and disgraceful; and since the propositions used in rhetoric are signs and probabilities, he has to discover the signs and probabilities he needs on those three subjects.

If we are trying to find something, we could search for it randomly, hoping to stumble upon it more or less by accident. That is what most people do when they are searching for arguments. We can do better if we go about our search for arguments, not randomly, but systematically.

When searching systematically for anything, we should look in the places where the objects sought are most likely to be found. For example, if we are searching for rabbits, the best places to look in are the places where one would usually find rabbits. Searching in just any place would be searching randomly, hoping to succeed by chance.

As in game hunting, so in rhetoric—we should look in *likely* places. More precisely, as in hunting we should look in certain places for rabbits, and in other places for crocodiles, so in rhetoric we should look in certain places for arguments about what is useful, and in other places for arguments about what is praiseworthy. To find the right argument, we should look in the right place.

Topics

Rhetoric provides places in which to look for proofs. They are called topics. The name comes from *topos*—the ordinary Greek word for place. We can recognise it in English words like *topology* and *topography*. In rhetoric, topics are generally accepted propositions from which signs and probabilities can be derived. When searching for proofs, we refer to the appropriate topics to see if they suggest signs or probabilities. If one is suggested, we then consider whether our listeners are likely to accept them. If we think they will, we have discovered a proof to use.

For example, suppose we wish to prove that a certain trophy is desirable. We refer to the collection of topics about desirable things, that is, topics of *the good and expedient* and come to one topic that states “*What many aim at or compete for is good*”. If we can prove that the trophy is competed for by many, we prove that it is good, therefore desirable. So we could construct an argument from a sign by saying:

That trophy is desirable; it is being competed for by more than 2,000 athletes.

Or we could use a probability by saying:

That trophy is desirable; all these national title trophies are widely contested.

As far as possible, signs and probabilities should be immediately credible to the listeners otherwise they themselves have to be proved, lengthening the arguments.

Knowledge of subject required

It is important to understand that topics by themselves are not arguments, nor will knowledge of topics alone provide a speaker with arguments. No matter what he is discussing, the speaker must be acquainted also with the facts of the matter. If he is unaware of the facts, he will have nothing from which to draw his proofs. For example, how can he advise on overseas trade if he knows nothing about the goods his country produces, the trade it is engaged in at present and what it needs? How can he accuse or defend someone if he knows nothing of his life and the circumstances of his actions? How can he praise or blame someone if he knows nothing of the outstanding things he has done? Rhetoric can provide no knowledge of this kind.

So while topics provide a guide on what to look for, the speaker must know what belongs to the subject in reality—or what appears to belong. Then, if there is anything expedient or harmful in it, he may give advice; if there is anything unjust or just, he may accuse or defend; if there is anything noble or disgraceful, he may praise or blame.

Further, since only what is possible was done or will be done, not the impossible; and since only what was about to happen did happen, and only what is about to happen will happen, the speaker wishing to persuade his listeners that something did happen or will happen must be ready with propositions about the possible and the impossible and about what was or is about to happen.

And since all speakers try to prove not only that some things are expedient or harmful, unjust or just, honourable or disgraceful, but also that they are great or small, either by themselves or compared to another, they must be ready with propositions dealing with greatness and smallness and the greater and the less.

Selecting proofs

Since the purpose of using logical proof is to make a statement clearer and more credible, the proof must be clearer and more credible than what it is intended to prove. Nothing can be made more understandable by what is less understandable, and nothing can be made more credible by what is less credible.

So we must not argue from every opinion, or simply from our own opinion. Rather, we must always argue from the opinions held by our listeners or from the opinions held by those whose opinions the listeners approve. Further, we must be careful that we use opinions held by *all* our listeners, or *most* of them, or the *most important* of them.

If we do not know the opinions held by our listeners and cannot question them to find out, we must classify them in some way—into republicans, students, pacifists, trade unionists, lawyers, and so on—and argue from opinions held by that class of people.

Proofs should not be taken from too far back. They should be about things that are immediately important to the listeners—their pay packets, their health, and so on. Using remote, abstract generalities like ‘the economic climate’ or ‘social justice’ will not persuade them. This is why educated speakers are often less successful than the uneducated. The educated speak about generalities whereas the uneducated speak about what more closely concerns their listeners.

As far as possible, proofs should be exclusive to the subject. Statements that can be applied to many subjects in common are not very persuasive. For example, if a speaker praises Winston Churchill because he was a painter, that praise can be shared by many other people who also are painters, and that is faint praise. But if he praises him because he was Britain’s war-time leader, he praises him alone.

Kinds of topics

There are three kinds of topics: special topics, common topics and general topics.

Special topics provide arguments about one kind of subject only. They cannot be used to provide arguments about other subjects. For example, the topics that can provide arguments that something is expedient cannot provide arguments that something is unjust. Other topics must be used for that.

Even though the several special topics are not used exclusively for one kind of rhetoric or another, most of them are more appropriate to one kind than to another. So for convenience they are grouped accordingly. However, some special topics are used in all three kinds of rhetoric, so they are brought together under the heading of *common* topics.

General topics are different to special topics because they can provide arguments about any subject at all. This means that they can be used instead of any of the special topics, or used to provide arguments about things for which there are no special topics. They are also used to find proofs to support other signs and probabilities.

Each topic can provide arguments about its opposites: the topics of the good and expedient can also provide arguments that something is bad or harmful; the topics of the possible can also provide arguments that something is impossible; and so on.

4 Happiness

Having considered rhetoric and its proofs in general, we must next consider the special topics for each kind of rhetoric in particular, beginning with *deliberative* rhetoric. We will first note the things about which a deliberative speaker gives advice and then consider the topics he uses to find his arguments.

Deliberative rhetoric

The deliberative speaker cannot give advice on everything—only on those good and bad things that may or may not happen. Things that necessarily are or will be, and things that cannot possibly be, are outside his scope. Even on things that are possible, advice is not always appropriate. Some things are simply not worth arguing about.

The subjects on which the deliberative speaker gives advice and on which he must inform himself depends on his area of interest. If this is politics, he advises on defence, law and order, public administration, economics, trade, health, education, and so on; if it is business, he advises on manufacturing, marketing, management, investment and the like. Unless he knows about the subjects in detail, he cannot offer any practical advice on them. The same applies for whatever the speaker wishes to discuss. He must inform himself on his subject first. We cannot treat these things here since their study is not the function of rhetoric. Sufficient if having pointed them out in passing, we leave their detailed study to the various appropriate sciences. What we must consider in detail here are the topics that will help the speaker, from his knowledge of the subject, devise his arguments.

To keep the study of topics in perspective, students should refer now and often to chapter 43 on proofs a speaker will need to discover, beginning on page 77.

Happiness

We all have some end or goal in life and to attain it we choose or avoid certain things. This goal is happiness and whatever we think constitutes it. We try to do the things we think will bring or increase our happiness, and we try to avoid the things we think will hinder, reduce or destroy our happiness or bring about its contrary. It is about these things that the deliberative speaker persuades or dissuades.

While everyone agrees that happiness is to be sought, not everyone agrees on what happiness is or what is required for it. But the ideas on happiness usually reduce to one of these:

1. Living a life of good conduct through virtue.
2. Living independently.
3. Living securely in the greatest pleasure.
4. Having an abundance of goods and servants together with the power to use and preserve them.

Whatever our idea of being happy, we believe we cannot be happy unless we possess one or several of the following things:

Wealth—an abundance of money, property or goods for our use or disposal by gift or sale, all remarkable for their number, size and beauty.

Honour—signs of respect given to those who have done or are capable of doing difficult good. They include titles, gestures, awards, gifts, memorials, privileges and the like.

Power—the right to rule others and be served by them.

Fame—a reputation for goodness or worth among all, or the good, or the wise.

Noble birth—descent from distinguished ancestors, famous for virtue, wealth or other things that men honour.

Family—children of physical, mental and moral excellence.

Friends—people who exert themselves to help.

Good fortune—good caused by chance, beyond skill, prediction or calculation.

Health—freedom from disability or illness.

Strength—ability to move things as one wills.

Stature—superiority in height and bulk, but in good proportion so as not to hinder movement.

Athletic ability—excellence in size, strength and speed.

Beauty

—in the young: a body suitable for sports and pleasant to look at.

—in the mature: a body that is strong and durable and pleasant but formidable to look at.

—in the old: a body without the disagreeable accompaniments of old age and able to contend with unavoidable labours.

Good old age—one that comes slowly with freedom from illness and pain.

Mental powers—perception, understanding, memory, readiness to learn, shrewdness, and other like qualities.

Science and art—perfections of the mind that enable us to understand and judge theoretical and practical things.

Virtue—qualities that make their possessor good and his actions good, such as prudence, justice, courage and self control.

5 The good and the expedient

Happiness and the things that constitute it, whether present or to come, are the things towards which the deliberative speaker must direct his speech. However, what he must set out before his listeners is what is expedient, because men deliberate, not about the end, but about the means to the end, that is, about expedient actions. Further, the expedient is a good. Consequently, we must first consider in simple terms the elements of the good and the expedient.

The good and the expedient

1. What is desired for its own sake, or what something else is chosen for is good.
2. What is desired by all things or by all things that have sense or reason; or what would be desired by all things if they could acquire sense or reason, is good.
3. What reason does approve, or what reason might approve in individual cases is good for those cases.
4. What brings wellbeing and independence; and independence itself, is good.
5. What *produces or preserves* the above things; what *entails* them; or what is likely to *prevent or destroy* their opposites, is good.

A thing *produces or preserves* another thing in three ways: in its own likeness, as fire produces warmth; as an instrument, as food produces warmth; or as an action, as exercise produces warmth.

A thing *entails* another thing in two ways: simultaneously, as health entails life; or subsequently, as learning entails knowledge. From this it follows that:

6. Acquiring a good thing or losing an evil thing is good.
7. Acquiring a greater good in place of a lesser good, or a lesser evil in place of a greater evil, is good.

Indisputable goods

Some things are believed immediately by most people to be good. Their opposites will be believed immediately to be evil. These indisputable goods are:

Happiness; virtues like courage and self control; mental powers like perception and memory; arts and science like engineering and mathematics; eloquence; life; health and beauty; pleasure; pleasant things and beautiful things; friends and friendship; honour; fame; wealth; justice.

Disputable goods

The goodness of other things might be disputed, so we may have to prove them. Proofs about them, or about their opposite evils, may be drawn from these topics:

1. What is contrary to an evident evil is good.
2. What happens as we wish is good; these are things that contain no evil at all, or less evil than good, such as some good with a slight penalty attached.
3. What is not excessive is good.
4. What many aim at or compete for is good.
5. What is worked hard for is good.
6. What is paid much for is good.
7. What is praised is good.
8. What is praised even by our opponents is good.
9. What is chosen by someone good or wise is good.
10. What is chosen by those we admire is good.
11. What is harmful to our enemies and helpful to our friends is good.
12. What will cause our friends to love us and our enemies to hate us is good.

13. What we can do easily is good.
14. What is easy in itself is good, that is, what all, or most, or our equals or inferiors have done successfully.
15. What we are good at, either naturally or by experience or practice is good.
16. What is suitable for us is good, such as things that are right for us on account of our birth or position.
17. Whatever we think we lack is good, no matter how unimportant.
18. Whatever we just happen to desire is good.
19. Whatever is the object of our special desire is good, such as victory for the man who loves victory, money for the man who loves money, or honour for the man who is ambitious because he loves honour.

6 The greater good and the more expedient

People often agree that both of two proposals are useful but dispute which is the more useful, so we must be able to find proofs for this. But before considering the topics of the greater good in detail we must look at the notions of greater and smaller in general.

Great and greater

Great, small, much and little are said in relation to the general size of things or the usual quantity of things. The great exceeds the general size of things while the small falls short of it. The same applies to much and little in regard to quantity.

Greater and more are said in relation to smaller and less.

What is as great as another and has something else besides in the greater. What is contained in another is the smaller.

What exceeds the same thing by more is the greater, and what makes a greater whole when added to the same thing in the greater.

The greatest of the greater class is the greater, and the class with the greater greatest is the greater class. For example, if men as a class are bigger than women, then the biggest man will be bigger than the biggest woman. And if the biggest man is bigger than the biggest woman, men generally will be bigger than women. Greatness of classes and greatness of things contained in them are proportionate.

The greater good

1. A larger number of good things is a greater good than a smaller number of good things, provided that the smaller number is part of the larger number.
2. Something that serves several purposes is better than something that serves fewer.
3. What is desired for its own sake is better than what is not. For example, strength is a greater good than exercise. So the end is a better thing than the means.
4. What is closer to the end is better than what is further from it, because what is nearer the end is more like the end.
5. What we desire more for ourselves or for our friends is the greater good, and what we desire less is the greater evil.

6. The good that lasts longer is greater than the one that is short lived, because we can use it whenever we wish.
7. What has more lasting pleasure is the greater good.
8. What is more free from pain as well as being pleasant is the greater good.
9. The good that is available in times of greater need, such as old age or illness, is the greater good.
10. What is chosen by all is a greater good than what is not; and what the majority choose is a greater good than what the minority choose.
11. What is chosen as the greater good by acknowledged experts or authorities is the greater.
12. What is admitted as greater by both opponents or enemies is the greater good.
13. What the better man would choose is the greater good, and likewise what no worthless man would choose.
14. What the better man possesses is the greater good.
15. What is more highly praised or honoured is the greater good.
16. What we acquire all by ourselves is a greater good than what we acquire with the help of others.
17. What can exist or be made to exist without the help of something else is better than what needs another.
18. What has less need of additions is a greater good than what has more need.
19. What is possible is a greater good than what is impossible. The impossible is no good.

7 Decision makers

The most important and the most effective means of counsel and persuasion is to understand the various forms of government and organization and the goals, offices and expedients of each.

Everyone is persuaded by arguments from expediency, because a society is preserved by what is expedient.

The goals of the organization must be considered, because decision makers choose things in reference to their goals. A democracy pursues freedom, for example, but a dictatorship seeks self preservation.

The character of the people in offices of power must be considered, because it is they who make the important decisions. Their character can be recognized from the goals of the organization, because men choose a goal in keeping with their character, just as they choose all other things in reference to that goal.

And further, we must remember that besides logical persuasion we have to use moral persuasion, because listeners have confidence in a speaker who appears to have certain qualities. So we should acquaint ourselves with the character of the

decision makers in power, because the character that is predominant is the one most likely to persuade.

But the nature and goals of organizations are outside the scope of rhetoric and must be studied in detail elsewhere.

8 The noble

We will now consider the topics of *display* rhetoric: all the noble and disgraceful things—especially virtue and vice—for which men, and even animals and lifeless things, are praised and blamed. These are the things at which the display speaker aims.

The noble is that which is desirable for its own sake and at the same time worthy of praise; or that which is good, and pleasant because it is good. These things are listed in the chapter dealing with the good and the expedient.

Virtues are necessarily noble because they are qualities that help us act reasonably in ourselves and towards others, help us provide and preserve good things, and help us confer many benefits on others.

Every virtue has several blameworthy vices opposed to it, either by way of deficiency or by way of excess in something of which the virtue is the reasonable and praiseworthy mean.

Principal virtues and vices

Justice helps us behave reasonably towards others by inclining us to respect their lawful rights. Opposed to justice are the many vices of injustice: violence, theft, cheating, and the rest.

Liberality helps us behave reasonably towards others by inclining us to part with our money to help them in their need. Its opposite vices are **avarice** and **extravagance**.

Friendliness helps us behave reasonably towards others by inclining us to be agreeable to them with suitable words and actions. Its opposite vices are **quarrelling** and **flattery**.

Truthfulness helps us behave reasonably towards others by inclining us to represent ourselves to them just as we are. Its principal opposite vices are **lying**, **boasting** and **irony**.

Courage helps us behave reasonably by moderating fear and daring in the face of physical danger. Its principal opposite vices are **cowardice** and **foolhardiness**.

Magnanimity helps us behave reasonably by moderating fear and daring at the prospects of great honours or dishonours in great and good undertakings. Its principal opposite vices are **timidity**, **ambition** and **vainglory**.

Magnificence helps us behave reasonably by moderating fear and daring when we are spending large sums of money for great and good undertakings. Its opposites are **meanness** and **wastefulness**.

Temperance helps us behave reasonably by moderating our desires for bodily

pleasures. Its principal opposite vices are **drunkenness**, **gluttony**, **lust** and **insensibility**.

Gentleness helps us behave reasonably by moderating our desire for revenge. Its opposite vices are **anger** and **undue patience**.

Seriousness helps us behave reasonably by moderating our desire for the pleasure of jokes and games. Its opposite vices are **buffoonery** and **boorishness**.

Prudence helps us behave reasonably by helping us to make wise decisions about what leads us to happiness and what hinders us, and by helping us to put those decisions into effect. Its principal opposite vices are **precipitation**, **thoughtlessness** and **inconstancy**.

Other noble things

Besides virtues there are many other things for which we can praise.

1. Whatever produces virtue and whatever comes from virtue by way of actions, affections or signs is noble.
2. Honour is noble because it is a sign of virtue.
3. Whatever is accompanied by honour or rewarded by honour is noble.
4. Whatever is done for honour rather than for gain is noble.
5. The contrary of those things of which we are ashamed is noble, because we are ashamed of whatever is disgraceful in words, actions or intentions.
6. Victory is noble, since it shows superior virtue.
7. Success gained for another rather than for oneself is noble.
8. Services rendered to one's benefactor is noble.
9. All acts of kindness are noble.
10. Whatever is done to please others rather than oneself is noble.
11. Good done for the community rather than for oneself is noble.
12. Whatever is worthy of remembrance is noble.
13. Possessions that bring no profit are noble.
14. What is fitting is noble, such as the things that are worthy of one's parents or worthy of one's own previous achievements.

Praise

Praise is speech that sets forth the greatness of a person's virtue, so to praise someone we refer to his actions and show that they are virtuous and great. Speech that sets forth the greatness of a person's virtue by amplifying his good achievements is called encomium. Speech that sets forth a person's happiness by amplifying his good actions or achievements is called blessing or congratulation.

Praise, encomium and congratulation are related to one another as are virtue, achievement and happiness. Happiness implies achievement, and achievement implies virtue; so congratulation implies encomium and encomium implies praise.

Since it is virtue that inclines a person to do good works, it will be helpful to our case if we can put forward several good actions of the same kind attributable to our subject because that will be seen as a sign of his virtue. Consequently, we should try to show that he has often acted the same way before, and even what some might

consider coincidences or strokes of fortune should be claimed as his deliberate good actions.

Praise can be given even to someone who has not yet achieved anything, provided we are confident he is likely to do so. For example, we might praise someone for his good birth and education because virtuous parents are likely to have virtuous children, and these are likely to develop and act in accordance with what they are taught.

For the purpose of praise we must assume that certain qualities we see in a person are really the better qualities that they closely resemble, and adopt the names of the better qualities. For example, the person who appears to be sharp tempered and passionate may be spoken of as frank and open; the apparently arrogant may be spoken of as magnificent and dignified; the foolhardy as courageous; the recklessly extravagant as generous and liberal. If a man risks his life when there is no necessity, he will be thought to be more likely to do so when there is a necessity; and if he is lavish to casual acquaintances, he will be more lavish with his friends.

Since praise is similar to advice and differs from it only in the way it is expressed, we can look for material for praise in what we would advise. For example, "Have great courage" is advice, but it can be changed to praise simply by saying, "He has great courage".

And in seeking material for praise we should consider not only the opinions of men in general but also the opinions of the particular audience before whom we speak, and praise what is especially esteemed by them. Generally speaking, whatever is esteemed should be considered praiseworthy because there seems to be a close resemblance between them.

Amplification

In addition to showing that a person is virtuous in that his actions are praiseworthy, we must also show that his virtue or his actions are outstanding. To do this we use amplification.

Amplification is simply an argument that shows something is great or greater. There are many means of amplification. For example, if what a man does is better or nobler and goes beyond what is expected, such as if he is moderate in the event of good fortune, or if he is courageous in the event of bad fortune, or if, when he gains power, he becomes better and more gentle. All these things render an action great.

Similarly, we may use topics derived from times and seasons, as when our expectations of promptness, speed, duration or frequency are surpassed. Also, that a man has often been successful in the same thing indicates that it is due to the man himself and not just to good fortune or chance. Refer also to the topics of the greater good.

Again, if he has done something first, or alone, or with only a few to help, or if he was chiefly responsible for it; or if it was because of him that honours or awards were established, or if he was the first to win some honour or award, we should make use of these facts. They all show that his actions were great.

If there is insufficient material for amplification in the subject himself we must compare him with others. We can compare him with famous people, for it is an amplification to be proved better than them. Or if we cannot compare him with the famous, we should compare him with ordinary people, because his virtue is amplified by his being shown superior to them.

Blame

The things for which we blame are the opposites of the things for which we praise, because blame is the opposite to praise. Likewise, depreciation is the opposite to amplification.

9 Acting unjustly

Next we have to consider the things related to *judicial* rhetoric—accusation and defence: why people act unjustly, the kinds of people who do so and the kinds of people they wrong. But first of all we must consider the notion of acting unjustly and the kinds of unjust actions people commit.

Acting unjustly is voluntarily causing injury contrary to the law. Law is either particular or general. Particular laws are those regulations by which a state is governed. General laws are the unwritten regulations that seem to be recognised universally.

We act voluntarily when we know what we are doing and we are not acting under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done deliberately (sometimes we act on impulse), but what is done deliberately is always done with knowledge because no one is ignorant of what he deliberately chooses.

Motives for unjust actions

Men injure others and commit evil actions because of malice and weakness. Malice is the deliberate choice of evil and weakness is the inability to control passions. If a man has one or more vices, it is in regard to that in which he is vicious that he will show himself unjust. For example, the avaricious man will be unjust in regard to money, the intemperate man in regard to bodily pleasures, the coward in regard to dangers (because in danger, fear makes him desert his comrades) and the ambitious man will show himself unjust in his desire for honours. The angry man will be unjust from his anger and his desire for revenge, the quarrelsome man from his vanity, the foolish man from his false ideas about right and wrong, and the shameless man from his contempt of others' opinion of him. In similar ways everyone will show injustice in regard to his own particular underlying weakness. All this will be clear partly from what has already been said about the virtues and vices and partly from what will be said about the emotions.

But for now we must consider the motives and the character of those who do wrong and those who suffer wrong. First we will talk about what wrongdoers try to get and try to avoid, because an accuser must show the number and nature of motive that are found in the alleged wrongdoer, and the defendant must show which of them are not.

Of all the actions a man does, some can be attributed to him as to their cause, others cannot. The actions that cannot be attributed to him arise either from accident or from necessity. Of the actions that come from necessity, some are caused by nature, and others are caused by force or compulsion. So all a man's actions not due to the man himself come from accident, nature or compulsion.

The actions that can be attributed to him as to their cause are those caused by either appetite or habit. Appetite is either rational or irrational. Rational appetite leads to the choice of good; irrational appetite leads to either anger or desire. Thus all the actions that man does are to be attributed to one of seven causes: accident, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger or desire.

Things are referred to *accident* when their cause is not determined to act one way or another, or when they are done without being intended, and this neither always nor frequently nor regularly. This can be seen from the definition of accident as "a cause that acts otherwise than one intends".

Actions are referred to *nature* when their cause is in the thing acting, and they occur in the same way always or frequently. As for things which happen *contrary* to nature, there is no need to examine in detail whether they come from a natural force or from some other cause. It seems they happen by accident.

Things are referred to *compulsion* when they are done by a person contrary to his desire or reason. Their cause is outside the agent.

Things are referred to *habit* when they are done because they have been done often.

Things are referred to *reason* when they are done because of some good that appears expedient, either as an end or as a means to an end, provided that it is for expediency that it is done. Intemperate people do expedient things, not because of their expediency, but because of the pleasure.

Things are referred to *anger* when they are done for revenge. We must distinguish between revenge and punishment. Punishment is given for the sake of the person punished. Revenge is taken for the sake of the person taking it so that he can get the pleasure of satisfaction.

Things are referred to *desire* when they are done because they appear to be pleasant. Things that are familiar and to which we have become accustomed are among the things we consider pleasant, for we do with pleasure many things that are not naturally pleasant, once they have become habitual.

From all this we can see that whatever we do of ourselves is, or seems to be, either good or pleasant; and since we do voluntarily what we do of ourselves, and do involuntarily what we do not do of ourselves, it follows that whatever we do voluntarily will be either something that is, or seems to be good, or something that is, or seems to be pleasant, because among good things we must include the removal of what is, or seems to be evil, and the exchange of a greater evil for a less, since in a way, both those things are desirable. Likewise, among pleasant things we must include the removal of what is, or seems to be painful, and the exchange of a greater pain for a less.

We must therefore become familiar with the number and nature of pleasant and expedient things. We have already considered expedient things when dealing with deliberative rhetoric. We will now consider pleasant things, and we will reckon our definitions adequate as long as they are neither unclear nor too precise.

10 The pleasant

Pleasure is what we experience when we perceive we have suddenly become established in a state that is natural to us. Pain is the opposite. The pleasant is whatever produces pleasure and the painful is whatever destroys it or produces pain. From this it follows that:

1. Doing or experiencing what is natural is pleasant; so things like ease, idleness, relaxation and sleep are pleasant. So is laughter and what causes it—humorous people, words and actions.
2. Doing or experiencing what has become habitual is pleasant because when a thing has become habitual it becomes almost natural. There is not much distance between the ‘often’ of habit and the ‘always’ of nature.
3. What is not compulsory is pleasant because compulsion is contrary to nature. So necessitated things like concentration, study and intense effort are painful, unless they have become habitual, for then the habit makes them natural, as it were, and pleasant.
4. Everything we desire, rationally or irrationally is pleasant. Irrational desires arise naturally without any reasoning process. They come through the body and through the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch, and are for things like food, drink and sex. Rational desires arise because we are convinced of something—there are many things we desire to see and obtain only after we have heard about them and have become persuaded.
5. Things we hope for are pleasant when their presence seems likely to bring us pleasure or advantage without pain. So even resentment is pleasant because those who are resentful are filled with delight at the thought of revenge and are pained beyond measure when they fail to get it.
6. Things we remember are pleasant, not only what was pleasant when present, but sometimes what was not, provided the outcome later was good or honourable. So it can be pleasant to recall toil and sorrow afterwards because it is pleasant to be free from evil.
7. Most desires are accompanied by pleasure because, as we saw, the recollection of a past pleasure or the hope of a future pleasure bring some pleasure with them. So even a man tormented by thirst will enjoy the recollection of having drunk and the hope that he will drink again. The lovesick enjoy talking or writing about their beloved because it seems to them that their remembrance makes their loved one present to them. Love always begins this way when the lover is happy, not only in the presence

of the beloved but also in his absence when he is called to mind. So there is a certain amount of pleasure even in mourning and lamentation, when the loved one's absence is painful. The pain comes from his absence, but the pleasure comes from recalling his personality and actions and, as it were, seeing him again.

8. Victory is pleasant because it suggests superiority, and everyone likes that. So we find all competitive games and disputations pleasant, especially when we are skilled, because victory comes through them. And revenge is pleasant because it is pleasant to succeed.
9. Honour and good reputation are pleasant because everyone believes he has the qualities of a worthy person, especially when those he trusts more say so: friends rather than strangers, neighbours rather than foreigners, the wise rather than the foolish, the majority rather than the minority.
10. Friends are pleasant because it is pleasant to be loved. Being loved gives us the impression that we really have good qualities because to be loved is to be cherished for one's own sake, and that is something we all desire. Being admired is pleasant because that honours us. Flattery and flatterers are pleasant even though the flatterer is a false friend and admirer. As a rule, we are fond of those who love, honour and flatter us.
11. Giving and receiving benefits is pleasant. Receiving means we get something we desire and giving means we have something in excess. Both of these are desirable. And since it is pleasant to give it is pleasant to help others and provide them with what they lack.
12. Learning and wonder are pleasant. Learning implies a return to the natural state of mind, and wonder implies a desire to learn. Both of these are desirable.
13. Since learning and wonder are pleasant, anything connected with them is pleasant too, like sudden changes of circumstances and close escapes from danger, because they excite our wonder; and works of art, because they cause us to learn.
14. Being regarded as wise is pleasant because wisdom consists in the knowledge of many things that cause wonder. Being in command is pleasant too because it implies having practical wisdom.
15. Doing the same thing often is pleasant because we become familiar with it and that is pleasant. Change, too, is pleasant because change is something natural while unchanging sameness is unpleasant. That is why people and things we see only at intervals are pleasant: there is change from what is usual to something unusual.
16. All similar things, for the most part, are pleasant to one another, because similar things have the same nature and what is natural is pleasant. So man is pleasing to man, horse to horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of proverbs like "Beast knows beast" and "Birds of a feather flock together".

17. Since what is similar to us is pleasant, and of all things it is our very own self that is most like us, we all more or less love ourselves. And since we love ourselves, we find our own words and works pleasant. These are the things that are pleasant. Painful things are the opposites.

11 Unjust actions

Just and unjust actions can be related in two ways to both laws and to persons. There are two kinds of laws: particular and general. Particular laws are those that each nation establishes for itself, and they are either written or unwritten. General laws are those based upon nature. There is a general idea of justice and injustice that accords with nature and that all men in some manner recognise, even when there is no agreement or even communication between them. So some things may be naturally just though they are forbidden by particular laws, and some things may be naturally unjust though they are not so forbidden. In reference to laws then, there are two kinds of unjust actions: those against particular laws and those against general laws.

Laws can also be divided in relation to persons because the things we should or should not do are concerned with the community generally or one of its members. So in relation to persons there are two kinds of unjust actions: those by which an individual is wronged, such as assault, and those by which the state is wronged, such as treason.

To be wronged is to suffer an unjust action, and to suffer an unjust action is to be injured against one's will by someone who voluntarily chooses to do so. The various kinds of injuries have been explained already in the section dealing with good and evil. Voluntary actions, as we saw, are committed without compulsion and with full knowledge of what is being done.

So all accusations concern actions against an individual or the state, and the accused will have acted either in ignorance or against his will, or else voluntarily and with knowledge, and this either by deliberate choice or from passion. We have already seen the circumstances in which anyone acts from deliberate choice, and we will consider the passions, or emotions, further on.

But very often the accused will admit the action but deny the description of the charge or the point on which it depends. For example, he will admit that he took something but deny that he stole; admit that he struck someone but deny that he committed assault; admit that he communicated with the enemy but deny that he committed treason. So it will be necessary to give a definition of theft or assault or treason in order that if we wish to prove that an offence was or was not committed, we will be able to put the case in a true light.

In all these instances the question at issue is whether the accused is or is not a wrongdoer and a person who acts from vice, because vice and wrongdoing consist in moral purpose, and terms such as theft and assault imply purpose. If a man struck someone, it does not follow in all cases that he has committed assault, but only if he struck with a certain purpose: to bring disrepute on the other person or to please

himself. Again, if he has taken something, it does not follow that he has committed theft, but only if he took it with a certain purpose in mind: to injure the other person, or to get something for himself. It is the same in all other cases.

Equity

We have seen that there are two kinds of just and unjust actions, for some concern laws that are written and others concern laws that are unwritten; and we have spoken of actions concerned with the written law. We will now consider actions in relation to unwritten laws.

There are two kinds of unwritten laws: one kind concerns things that are followed by praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards. For example, to be grateful to a benefactor, to help one's friends, and the like. The other kind concerns what is omitted from particular written laws, and they come under the heading of equity. Equity seems to be justice that goes beyond the written law.

These omissions are sometimes intended and sometimes unintended by the legislators: unintended when they may have overlooked something; intended when they were unable to make a definition to cover all cases, and so had to make a general statement which is applicable not to all cases, but only to most.

An example of this is when it is necessary to legislate about the size and kind of instrument used in assault. A definition of such a weapon would be very difficult owing to the infinite number of possibilities, and life would not be long enough to account for them all. So the legislators must have recourse to general terms, and if a man wearing an ordinary ring strikes someone, according to the written law he might be guilty of assault with a weapon, but in reality he is not. This is a case for equity.

If this notion of equity is correct, it is easy to see what things and persons come under it. Wrongful actions, errors and accidents do not all deserve the same penalties. Accidents are things that are unexpected and not vicious; errors are not vicious either, but they are not unexpected; wrongful actions are both expected and vicious, for they arise from vice.

Equity should guide our judgments on all actions that call for leniency, for it is equitable to pardon human weakness and to look, not to the law but to the lawmaker; not to the letter of the law but to the lawmaker's intention; not to the action itself but to the agent's intention or moral purpose; not to the part but to the whole; not to what a man is now but to what he has been, always or generally; to remember good rather than ill treatment; to remember benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to appeal to the judgment of reason rather than to force; to prefer arbitration rather than litigation, for the arbitrator keeps equity in mind while the judge looks only to the law. The very reason why arbitrators are appointed is that equity might prevail.

12 The greater wrong

Offences are greater in proportion to the injustice from which they come. So sometimes the slightest actions are the worst because of the great potentiality for

wrong they contain. For example, if someone steals money, no matter how little, from a poor box, there is nothing he won't steal.

Offences are greater when committed in the very place where justice is administered, as is done by witnesses who lie in court. If a man will do wrong in court, where would he not do wrong?

Offences against the unwritten law are greater than offences against the written law, for written laws involve compulsion while the unwritten laws do not, and so while acting in accordance with the unwritten laws deserves greater merit, acting contrary to them deserves greater demerit.

From another point of view, offences against the written laws are greater than offences against the unwritten laws, for a man who is willing to commit offences against laws that carry punishment is willing to commit offences also against the laws that do not.

An offence is greater if it is without precedent, or if few others have committed it. Similarly, those are greater which have been frequently committed or long planned.

Another way of judging offences is by the extent of the injury done. An offence is greater when there is no adequate punishment for it but all fall short of what is required; when there is no remedy, because it is hard, or impossible to set things right; and when the injured person cannot obtain satisfaction because it is beyond repair.

An offence is greater if because of it new laws and penalties had to be made.

An offence is greater the more brutal it is, and when hearing of it moves us to fear rather than to pity.

An offence is greater if it is accompanied by the greater disgrace; for example, when a man commits a wrong against his benefactor. In this case he is doubly at fault; not only does he commit wrong, he fails to return good for good.

13 The wrongdoer

Wrongdoers

It is in this state of mind that people commit wrong:

1. They think the action is possible, that is, it can be done, and done by them.
2. They think the action will be undiscovered, or
3. If it is discovered, it will go unpunished, or
4. If it is punished, the punishment will be less than the gain made by themselves or by their friends.

Possible

What people consider possible or impossible will be seen later in the section dealing with the common topics.

Undiscovered

These people think their actions will remain undiscovered:

1. Those whose qualities are out of keeping with their action, for example, a small man assaulting a big man.

2. Those who have no enemies at all; they expect to escape notice because they are not being watched.
3. Those who have many enemies; they reckon they would be thought unlikely to attack those on their guard, and they can defend themselves by pleading they were unlikely to have tried it.
4. Those who have means or places to conceal stolen goods or other evidence, or have many opportunities of disposing of it.
5. Those who have often been undiscovered or unpunished.
6. Those who are highly respected; they think they will not be suspected.
7. Those who are held in great contempt; they think they will not be suspected any more than they are already.

Unpunished

These people think their actions will go unpunished:

1. Those who are eloquent, business-like, experienced in litigation, or wealthy, or who have many friends.
2. Those who have friends, employees or accomplices who have the qualities listed above.
3. Those who are friends of the ones being wronged, because friends are not on their guard against being wronged, and they would rather make up than take proceedings.
4. Those who are friends of the judge, because judges favour those of whom they are fond and either acquit them altogether or impose a light sentence.
5. Those who can get the trial set aside or put off, or who can corrupt the judges.
6. Those who hope to obtain indulgence.
7. Those who may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or to have been forced, or to have acted from some natural impulse or habit, that is, those who may be thought to have committed an error rather than a crime.
8. Those who are in need; either the poor in need of necessities, or the rich in need of superfluities.

Punishment less than profit

These people think their unjust actions will incur a punishment that is less than what they gain:

1. Those who, if fined, can get payment set aside or put off for a long time.
2. Those who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the pain and the loss come later. These are the intemperate people—intemperance being concerned with all things men long for.
3. Those who, on the other hand, expect the pain and the loss to be immediate while the pleasure and the profit come later and are more lasting; temperate and wiser men pursue this course.
4. Those who, because of their poverty, have nothing to lose.

Victims

Wrongdoers commit unjust actions against these kinds of persons:

1. Those who possess what the wrongdoer lacks, either something necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable; and they might be either far away or near, for in one case the gain is quick, and in the other case, reprisals are slow.
2. Those who cannot afford to spend time waiting for prosecutions and damages, such as foreigners or travellers; they are ready to drop proceedings and settle on easy terms.
3. Those who are going to be attacked by others if the wrongdoer does not attack first. He must act at once or lose his chance.
4. Those who are never cautious or on guard but always trusting; for they are easily caught unawares.
5. Those who are lazy, because only a person willing to take pains will prosecute.
6. Those who are bashful, because they are unlikely to fight about money.
7. Those who are unskilled in speech or in action, because they will not attempt to prosecute or come to terms, or else they will not succeed if they try.
8. Those who have no friends.
9. Those who have never been wronged, because they are off their guard and not expecting to be attacked.
10. Those who have often been wronged, because they too are off their guard, not expecting to be attacked again.
11. Those who have been slandered, or who are easy to slander, such as those subject to class hatred or envy; because they do not care to prosecute for fear of the judges; or if they do prosecute, they fail.
12. Those who have often been wronged but have not prosecuted, because they are easy prey.
13. Those who have often prosecuted and been unsuccessful, for there are always those willing to return to a fight.
14. Those who are friends of the wrongdoer, because they are easy to injure.
15. Those who are enemies of the wrongdoer, because it is pleasant to injure them.
16. Those from whom the wrongdoer can expect mercy.
17. Those who have injured the wrongdoer, or intended to, or intend to, or are about to injure him; because then his revenge would be pleasant, it would be claimed to be honourable, and it would seem to be almost an act of justice.
18. Those against whom the wrongdoer has a complaint, or with whom he previously had a difference; for then his action seems almost like justice.
19. Those who have often done wrong to others, especially if it is the very wrong

that they themselves are now suffering; because it seems almost justice that someone should suffer the wrong he often inflicts on others.

20. Those who or whose ancestors or friends the accused can pretend have committed or intend to commit wrong against himself, or his ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard; because as the proverb has it, "Evil only needs an excuse".
21. Those for whom the wrongdoer will be able to do many acts of kindness after having done this injustice, with the idea that it will be easy to repair the wrong.
22. Those whom the wrongdoer injures in order to please his friends, his masters or those he admires, that is, those who rule his life.

Kinds of offences

Wrongdoers commit these kinds of unjust actions:

1. Wrongs that all or many people commit; because they expect they will be pardoned.
2. Wrongs that are not easily imputed to them, because they hope to remain undetected. For example, they steal objects that can be easily concealed, like eatables that are quickly consumed; things that can be easily changed in shape, colour or composition; things that can be easily hidden; things of which they already possess many which are exactly alike or hard to distinguish.
3. Wrongs which the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages on women or children.
4. Wrongs, complaints about which would give the appearance of pettiness or litigiousness.
5. Wrongs of which the profit is sure, large or immediate, and the punishment is small, uncertain or remote.
6. Wrongs whose profits are real material gains and whose only punishment is disgrace.
7. Wrongs which appear to be creditable while the punishment is only loss of money, exile, or something like that. For example, to avenge injury done to one's parents.
8. Wrongs whose profits no punishment can equal. This seems to be the case in dictatorships and the like.
9. Wrongs that are done quite openly and in everyone's sight, because these are not guarded against, since no one thinks they would happen.
10. Wrongs that are so great and of such a kind that no one would be even likely to attempt them; because they would not be guarded against either. Everyone guards against ordinary ailments, but no one guards against ailments that no one has ever suffered.

14 Real proofs

In addition to invented proofs, all three kinds of rhetoric—judicial rhetoric especially—use ready-made or real proofs. They are laws, witnesses and contracts and compulsion.

Laws

If the written law is unfavourable to our case we must have recourse to general law and equity as being more just. We must argue that general law and equity are constant and never change while written laws are often varied; that better men should make use of and obey the unwritten law rather than the written law; and that the judge in undertaking to decide to the best of his judgement undertakes not to decide rigorously by the written law; that true justice is real and expedient, but justice that is only apparent is not; and the judge, like an assayer of precious metals, must distinguish the false justice from the true.

We must consider if one law contradicts another law, or contradicts itself; for example, if one law provides that all contract shall be binding, and another law forbids making contracts that are contrary to a law.

If the meaning of a law is equivocal, we must interpret it in the way that best suits the application of expediency, for deliberative rhetoric, or of justice, for judicial rhetoric.

And if the circumstances that led to the enactment of a law are now obsolete while the law itself remains, we must try to make this clear and overcome the law in this way.

But if the written law is favourable to our case, we must argue that the decision must not be contrary to the written law since there is no difference between not making laws and not using laws; that trying to be wiser than the law is just what is forbidden by the law, and that there is no advantage in trying to be wiser than the physician—a mistake made by the expert does less harm than the habit of disobeying the expert.

Witnesses

Witnesses are either living witnesses or witnesses from the past. Witnesses from the past are those former thinkers, writers and men of repute whose judgements are known to all, and those men of learning and authority who commented on how things might or should be in the future. Proverbs too, although their origins are anonymous, are useful as evidence on what should or should not be done.

Living witnesses include both those who are involved with the present proceedings and those who are unconnected with them. Unconnected witnesses are well known authorities who have given judgements or opinions useful to those who are arguing about similar cases.

Involved witnesses are those who are at risk because they can always be charged with perjury. These witnesses serve only to establish whether or not something was done, and whether something is or is not the case. They are not competent to establish the quality of an act, such as its justice or injustice, its expediency or

inexpediency. Witnesses from the past are very trustworthy in this regard because they cannot be corrupted.

If a speaker has no witnesses to support his case, he can argue that the decision should be made according to what is probable, and that this is what is meant by deciding according to one's best judgement; that probabilities cannot be bribed to mislead, and that they cannot be a false witness.

But if a speaker has witnesses and his opponent has none, he can argue that probabilities do not incur responsibility, and that evidence would not be needed at all if an investigation according to probable arguments was sufficient.

Some evidence concerns the speaker, some his opponent, regarding either their moral character or the facts of the case. Clearly then, a speaker need never lack useful evidence, for if he has no evidence about the facts supporting his own case or against his opponent's case, he can always obtain some evidence about character that will establish his own good character and credibility and the opposite in his opponent.

For other arguments about a witness—whether he is a friend or an enemy or neither, or is of good, bad or fair character, and so on—we should refer to the relevant topics.

Contracts

When dealing with contracts, the speaker should use arguments to magnify or minimise their importance and to prove that they deserve or do not deserve belief. If they are on the speaker's side, he might try to prove that they are credible and valid; but if they are on his opponent's side, he must do the opposite. The method he uses is exactly the same as for dealing with witnesses because a contract is trustworthy or not according to the character of the parties to it.

If the existence of a contract is admitted, and it is in the speaker's favour, he must strengthen it by claiming that a contract is a special and partial law, and that it is not the contract that gives force to the law but rather it is the law that makes a contract binding. And generally speaking, law itself is a kind of contract, so that whoever disobeys or breaks a contract, disobeys or breaks the law. In any case, most transactions are conducted according to a contract, so if we destroy the authority of contracts, we destroy the very basis on which men deal with one another.

But if the contract favours his opponent, the speaker should use the same kinds of arguments he would use if the law were against him. He should argue that it would be strange to consider ourselves always bound by a contract when we do not always feel bound by a law that has been ill conceived and badly made; that one cannot by force or fraud alter justice, for it has a foundation in nature, but contracts may be made under both those conditions, and that it is not the terms of the contract that must be considered but what is more just.

The speaker should also examine whether the contract is contrary to any written laws, or to any general laws, or to any other earlier or later contracts, for then he may be able to argue that the earlier one is valid and the other not, or the other way round, whichever suits his purpose.

He might also consider the matter of expedience, that is, whether the contract would be in any way for or against the interests of the judges.

Compulsion

Evidence obtained by compulsion is a kind of evidence that can be trusted because there is some sort of necessity involved in it.

If the evidence is in our favour, we can amplify its importance by claiming that it is the only true kind of evidence; while if it is not in our favour but in favour of our opponent, we should destroy its worth by talking about coercion and torture in general—those being coerced or tortured are just as likely to give false testimony as true because some people are ready to tell lies rather than endure anything, while others are just as ready to endure anything rather than admit the truth.

15 Common topics

All speakers find it necessary at times to prove that something is possible or impossible, that something has or has not happened, or that something will or will not happen. And in all kinds of speaking, whether persuading or dissuading, praising or blaming, accusing or defending, they use amplification to prove that something is great or is greater than another. Enthymemes for all these purposes can be discovered by using the common topics.

Of these, the topics of amplification are most appropriate to display rhetoric, the topics of the past are most appropriate to judicial rhetoric, and the topics of the possible and the future are most appropriate to deliberative rhetoric.

Possible and impossible

If it is possible for one of two contrary things to exist or begin to exist, then it seems that it is equally possible for the other. For example, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill. Conversely, if he cannot be ill, he cannot be cured.

In the same manner, if one of two like things is possible, so also is the other.

And if the parts are possible, so is the whole; and if the whole is possible, so are the parts. For example, if the front, the back, the collar and the sleeves can be made, so also can the coat; and if the coat can be made, so also can its various parts.

If the genus is something that is possible, so also is the species; and if the species, so also the genus. For example, if a ship can be built, so can a trawler, and if a trawler can be built, so can a ship.

If one of two correlatives is possible, so also is the other. For example, if the double is possible, so also is the half; and if the half is possible, so also is the double.

Things that are the subjects of sciences and arts can come into existence and exist.

Things that we love or desire naturally are possible, because as a rule no one loves or desires the impossible.

If the beginning is possible, so also is the end result, for nothing impossible comes into existence or even begins to exist. For instance, a square circle could not be possible or begin to be possible. So if a child can come into existence, so can a man, for a child is a beginning.

And when the end result is possible, so also is the beginning, because everything starts from a beginning.

If what follows after in being or generation is possible, so also is what comes before. For example, if a man can come into existence, so can a child, because the child comes before the man.

If the harder of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And so if it is possible to make something beautiful it is possible to make it simply. For example, if it is possible to make a beautiful house, it is possible to make an unqualified house, because it is harder to make a beautiful house than to make the house without the beauty.

If something can be made without the aid of art or skill, all the more can it be made with their help. And if something is possible for those who are inferior, or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be all the more possible for those with the opposite qualities.

And also possible are those things whose origins are in what we can control by force or persuasion, or which depend on those whose superiors, masters or friends we are.

Arguments for what is impossible can be derived from the opposites of what has been said about the possible.

Past events

Whether a thing has happened or not can be proved from the following topics.

If something which is naturally less likely has happened, then that which is more likely will have most probably happened.

If that which usually happens afterwards has happened, then that which usually happens before must have happened also. For example, if a man has forgotten a thing he must have once learnt it.

If all the natural consequences of actions or motives have happened, then the antecedent or cause has happened. For example, if there has been thunder then there has been lightning, and if someone has committed a crime he has also attempted it.

And if all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have happened, their consequences must have happened too. For example, if there has been lightning then there has been thunder, and if a man has attempted a crime, he has also committed it.

If someone was able to do something and intended to do it, he has done it, because whenever men are able and resolved to do something, they do it, since nothing hinders them. And if he was able to do it and was angry, or if he was able and desired it, he has done it, for as a rule, men do what they long for whenever they can. The vicious do it from lack of self control, the virtuous do it because they desire what is good. Further, if he intended to do it and there were no external obstacles, then he has done it.

And if something was on the point of being done, probably it was done, because it is likely that a person who was on the point of doing something has done it.

Of all these things, some are related necessarily, while others are related by way of general rule only.

To prove that something has not happened, we should use arguments derived from the opposites of all these things.

Future events

We can argue in regard to future things in the same way because if we are able to do something and intend to do it, it will be done, as also will those things that we are urged to do by desire or anger, if we have the power.

For the same reason, if someone has a strong desire or intention of doing something, it probably will be done, because as a rule, the things that are about to happen are more likely to happen than those which are not.

And if all the natural antecedents have happened, what usually follows them will happen. For example, if the sky is cloudy, it will probably rain.

And if one thing has been done with a view to another, this other also will be done. For example, if a foundation has been laid, a house probably will be built.

Once again, we can argue that something will not happen by using the opposites of what we have just seen.

Magnitude

When we considered deliberative rhetoric we studied the greatness and smallness of things, the greater and the less, and the greater and the lesser goods. Since what is discussed in each kind of rhetoric is something good, namely the expedient, the noble and the just, it is clear that we can derive all our materials for amplification of these from the topics of the greater good. To enquire further about the great or the greater in general would be pointless because in practical matters the particular is more useful than general ideas.

16 Maxims

Maxims, or wise sayings, are general statements about the objects of human conduct and what should be chosen or avoided in relation to them. An example of a maxim is: “No sensible man over-educates his children”. A statement like: “John does not over-educate his children” is not a maxim because it is not a general statement. It is a statement about an individual person. “The straight is the opposite to the curved” is not a maxim either. It is a general statement, but it is not about human conduct.

Maxims are useful for logical proof because the common and frequently quoted maxims seem to be accepted by all as true.

They are also useful because uncritical listeners are pleased to hear their own opinions expressed in general terms.

And they are especially useful for moral proof because they allow us to show our moral character by stating our moral preferences. If our preferences are good our character appears good.

Maxims can be used as the conclusions of enthymemes by adding the reason. For example, “No man can serve two masters” is a maxim; when the reason is added the whole becomes an enthymeme: “...for either he will hate the one and love the other, or love the one and despise the other.”

Sometimes the maxim can be supported by something that is not a proof statement but which expresses the reason for the maxim. The result is not an enthymeme but it has the character of one, as in: “That offer may not be as advantageous as it appears; all that glitters is not gold”. A maxim used this way must be well known, or else it must be clear, to those who consider it, as soon as it is said, like: “You should not create needs for yourself; he has most who desires least”.

If the maxim states anything contrary to general opinion or anything that is disputed, we must add a supporting statement. The maxim “No man is really free” might be disputed, so the reason must be added: “...because he is the slave either of wealth or of fate”. Alternatively, the reason may be stated first: “Since man is slave either of wealth or of fate, no man is really free”.

When the maxim is not contrary to general opinion and is not disputed, but its meaning is not clear, the reason should be added as concisely as possible. Terse and riddling statements can be used. A general warned his enemy, “You ought not be insolent, lest your cicadas be forced to chirp from the ground”; meaning that their country would be so devastated that there would be no trees left standing.

Maxims can be found in great abundance in published collections. Many proverbs can be used as maxims too because they deal with human conduct.

Popular sayings not yet established as proverbs by long usage are useful as maxims because they are frequently quoted and appear to be accepted by all as true.

We can compose maxims by generalizing the opinions our listeners already hold. We do this by guessing how they formed their preconceived ideas and prejudices and what they are, and then expressing them in general terms. This kind of maxim is especially useful for complaint and exaggeration. For example, anyone who happens to have a noisy neighbour will welcome the statement that there is nothing more troublesome than neighbours.

We can also compose maxims that are contrary to proverbs and popular sayings. These are especially useful when we want to speak with or if we want to make our character look better. When we compose these maxims we should make our moral purpose clear or else we should add our reason. For example, we could express this way: “They say that experience is the best teacher, but I disagree with that. Some people seem never to learn from experience. This man makes blunder after blunder, and we see no sign of improvement.” And we can make our character look better by saying, “It is said ‘Nothing in excess’ but I do not agree with it. I say that you cannot hate evil too much.”

Maxims should not be used by a youthful speaker nor used in regard to things of which the speaker has no experience. These uses would show a lack of judgment.

17 General topics

The special topics we have seen will provide very many proofs that something is good or evil, noble or disgraceful, just or unjust, and so on. For additional proofs in any of these matters, or for proofs in matters not covered by special topics, we can use general topics. They will provide proofs about any subject.

Contraries

One topic from which we can derive demonstrative proofs is contraries. Something can be said of another if its contrary can be said of the other's contrary. For example: "Since war is responsible for bringing on our present sufferings, we must relieve them by means of peace".

And, something cannot be said of another if its contrary cannot be said of the other's contrary. For example: "Men do not always disbelieve what is false, since they do not always believe what is true".

Derivatives

Proofs can also be found in the various modifications a word can undergo: healthy, health's, healthily, healthiness, and so on. All these are derivatives of the word health.

Something can be said of another if a derivative can be said of it. For example: "Health must be a good thing because to be healthy is something highly valued". And, something cannot be said of another if a derivative cannot be said of it. For example: "Justice is not entirely good because to be justly imprisoned is not something desirable".

Correlatives

Proofs can be found in correlatives. Something can be said of another if it can be said of its correlative. For example: "If it is not disgraceful for you to buy it from us, it is not disgraceful for us to sell it to you". Similarly, if one person can be said to have acted rightly or justly, then the other can be said to have suffered rightly or justly. And if the one who suffers does so rightly or justly, then the one who inflicts the suffering does so equally rightly or justly.

But a fallacy can be hidden in this argument. It is possible for a person to inflict suffering justly and therefore for someone to suffer justly, but perhaps not at this particular person's hands. We must consider separately whether someone deserves to be punished, and whether the person inflicting the punishment is the right person to do so.

More and less

Proofs can be found in the more and the less probable. Something can be said of another if it can be said of what is less probable. For example: "Of course he knows that; even his pupils know it".

And, something cannot be said of another if it cannot be said of what is more probable. For example: "You cannot expect him to know that; not even his teacher knows it".

Again, something can be said of another if what is less probable can be said of it. For example: “We can be sure he beats his neighbours; he even beats his own father”.

And, something cannot be said of another if what is more probable cannot be said of it. For example: “He cannot run that far; he can’t even walk it”.

And yet again, when there is of question of more and less; something can be said of another if it can be said of what is equally probable. For example: “If you deserve compensation for having suffered that injury, does not he equally deserve compensation for suffering the same?”

Other arguments from the equally probable can be constructed in the same ways as those from the more and less probable.

Time

Proofs can be found by looking at time. For example: “If, before I had started work, I had asked for payment, you would have promised it. Do not refuse payment now simply because I trusted you and did not ask until I had finished”.

Opponent’s actions

Proofs can be found in an opponent’s actions. To turn an opponent’s words against himself is an excellent method of refutation because it is unreasonable for anyone to blame or accuse others for doing what he himself does or would do, or to urge others to do what he himself does not or would not do. For example: “You say I should attack now because attack is the best method of defence. Well, did you attack when you had the opportunity? No, you did not!”

And in judicial rhetoric: “You say you would not have committed such an action. Well then, if you would not have done it, would I have done it?”

This kind of argument can be used only against a person who is likely to have done something wrong. To use it against an opponent who is above suspicion is ridiculous. An accuser generally tries to look better than the accused, so we should always show that he is not.

Definitions

Proofs can be found in definitions. Something can be said of another if it can be said of the other’s definition. For example: “Eloquence is good because to be able to influence the thoughts and feelings of others by means of our speech is something very desirable”.

And, something can be said of another if its definition can be said of the other. For example: “That division is fair; it is an equal share for everyone”.

Meanings of terms

Proofs can be found in the various meanings of a term. For example: “When we say something is right we mean either that it is expedient or that it is honourable. I do not claim that the proposal is expedient, but no one can deny that it is honourable”.

Divisions

Proofs can be found in divisions. For example: “There are three motives for wrongdoing; two are excluded as impossible, and not even my accusers suggest the third”.

And, “There are only three people who could have done it. It wasn’t Tom and it wasn’t Dick, so it must have been Harry”.

Inductions

Proofs can be found in inductions. Something can be said of another generally if it can be said of its several individual instances. For example: “If the driver who is skilled is the best driver, and the pilot who is skilled is the best pilot, then in general, the man who is skilled is the best man in any particular sphere”.

Similarly, something can be denied of another generally if it can be denied of its several individual instances. For example: “If we do not entrust our horses to those who have neglected the horses of others, or our ships to those who have lost the ships belonging to others, then, if this is so in all cases, we should never entrust our safety to those who have failed to preserve the safety of others”.

Previous decisions

Proofs can be found in previous decisions about the same matter, or what is similar, or what is contrary. If possible, we should use a decision that was unanimous, or was the same at all times; if not, we should use a decision of the majority, or of the wise, either all or most, or of the good; or a decision of the present decision makers themselves, or of those whose judgment they accept, or of those whose judgment it is not possible to contradict, such as those in authority, or those whose judgment it would not be proper to contradict, such as rulers, or parents, or teachers. For example: “You must not steal; God has forbidden it!”

Or, “The time has come to change our Constitution; the referendum shows that ninety percent of the people want it changed”.

Particular instances

Proofs can be found in particular instances. For example: “He speaks four languages; he speaks French, Spanish, Italian and German”.

Or, “You say he upsets customers. Well, which ones has he upset? Can you give me the name of even one of them?”

Consequences

Proofs can be found in the good and bad consequences that follow most things in human affairs. We can use these consequences to argue either way: to persuade or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame. For example: “We should be well educated, because if we are, we will be wise”.

Or, the other way: “We should not be well educated, because if we are, we will be the subject of envy”.

Contrary consequences

Proofs can be found in the contrary consequences of contrary things. For example: “You should not enter politics; if you lean to the left, the liberals will hate you, and if you lean to the right, the socialists will hate you”.

This kind of dilemma can be rebutted with the opposite proof: “You should enter politics; if you lean to the left the socialists will welcome you, and if you lean to the right, the liberals will welcome you”.

Paradox

Proofs can be found in what people say privately as distinct from what they say publicly, and contrariwise. In public they approve what is just and honest, while in private they approve what is expedient. So against a speaker's public statement we should try to put what he has said in private and vice versa. In either case he is shown to contradict himself.

Analogy

Proofs can be found in analogous things. For example: "If you want to insist that tall boys are to be considered men, then you must accept the proposal that short men will be considered boys".

Similar consequences

Proofs can be found in similar consequences, concluding from the similarity of these consequences the similarity of the antecedents. For example: "Increasing taxes is the same as reducing wages; in either case we get less money in our pay packets".

Priorities

Proofs can be found in an earlier choice of priorities, because people do not always prefer one thing as more important than another, but sometimes they reverse the order. For example: "If, when we had no freedom, we fought to get it, we would be foolish to relinquish it now that we have it, simply to avoid a fight".

This means that at one time they preferred freedom to peace and now they prefer peace to freedom.

Motives

Proofs can be found in what moves people to act or not to act. If these things exist they determine us to act; if they don't exist, they determine us not to act; for instance, if something is possible, or easy, or useful to ourselves or our friends or harmful to our enemies, or if the punishment is less than the gain, and so on. We use these things to persuade and their contraries to dissuade. We can also use the same things to accuse and defend because the things that persuade can be used to accuse, and the things that dissuade can be used to defend.

Plausible motives

Proofs for denying alleged motives for something that is or was, can be found in what generally is or might possibly be a motive for it. For example: "He gave her that gift, not to please her, but to cause her even greater distress by depriving her of it later". After all, that could have been his motive.

Inconsistencies

Proofs can be found in inconsistencies in times, words or actions. This topic is useful for refutation. We should examine these things, first in our opponent: "He says he is concerned for you, but he conspired with the enemy"; next in ourselves: "He says I am litigious, yet he cannot prove that I ever brought an action against anyone"; finally in our opponent and ourselves together: "He has never lent you anything, but I have often helped many of you".

Reason for error

Proofs to refute false accusations or blame can be found in the reason for holding the false opinion; there must be some reason why the accuser thought the accused guilty. When that reason is stated the accusation is destroyed. For example: “He accused her of stealing his money; and he did this because he saw her spending extravagantly. But her newly acquired wealth was not stolen; she had won it in a lottery”.

Cause

Proofs can be found in the cause, since if the cause exists, the effect exists also; and if the cause does not exist, neither does the effect. For example: “He is immune to cholera; he has had the inoculation”. Or, “That car will not go; it has no fuel.”

The better

Proofs can be found in something better than what is being advised, or is being done, or has been done. If what is better was not chosen, then the accused did not do what is worse, because no one willingly or knowingly prefers what is worse.

However, arguments based on this topic can be false, because often it is not until later that the better becomes known, having been uncertain before.

Past action

When something is proposed that is contrary to what was done in the past, proofs can be found by looking at them together. For example: “If you think he is a hero, you ought not resolve to ignore him, because you have always rewarded brave men”.

Names

Proofs can be found in the meaning of names. This topic is usually used for praise and blame. For example: “He is Wiseman by name, and a wise man by nature”.

18 False topics

Since what is not the same as another often has a false likeness and can be thought by some to be the same, it may happen that a speaker may use enthymemes that are not real but only apparent. Just as real enthymemes are based on true topics, apparent enthymemes are based on false topics, so we need to see how apparent enthymemes are constructed and consider the various false topics from which they can be derived.

Manner of speech

Sometimes a concise and antithetical statement passes for an enthymeme. For example: “A profession is an honourable thing, for to be without a profession is most dishonourable”. This kind of statement appears to contain an enthymeme but in fact there is none. The false appearance seems to be an effect of the manner of speaking.

Equivocation

An argument may contain a word that is used with more than one meaning. For example: “Since religion is the opium of the people, it should be policed under the drug control laws”. This use of a word in more than one sense is called equivocation.

Composition and division

What is true of several things taken separately may not be true of them taken in combination. And what is true of them combined may not be true of them taken separately. So apparent enthymemes can be constructed from the false topic of composition and division. An example of false composition is: “Since every player in the team is first class, it is a first class team”. An example of false division is: “It is right for a man to help his nephew, and it is right for this senator to award government contracts; and that is what was done”. However, if the two are combined, the action perhaps ceases to be right.

Exaggeration

The false appearance of an enthymeme can be given by assuming the alleged fact is true and then greatly exaggerating it. If the accuser does this, it makes the accused look more guilty; but if the accused himself does it, it makes him look not guilty. However, in both cases, nothing has been proved, even though there might seem to be an enthymeme.

Sign

The use of a sign to prove a universal statement gives rise to another kind of apparent enthymeme. For example: “All these new cars are shoddy; mine is only two months old and it rattles”.

Accident

Another kind of apparent enthymeme is based on the false topic of accident. This occurs when the speaker argues from some accidental feature rather than from an essential point. For example, when a researcher says of the animals he uses in his experiments, that “They should be praised for making an important contribution to medical science”. But of course any contribution by the animals is accidental.

Consequent

To argue that John is a thief because he is a criminal is an example of an apparent enthymeme based on the topic of false consequent. This argument is false because while every thief is a criminal, not every criminal is a thief.

Cause

Another apparent enthymeme arises from taking as the cause what is not the cause. This happens when a speaker argues that one thing caused another because it happened at the same time, or before it. It is frequently believed that what happens after another is caused by it, and a politician who makes a decision will be blamed for all the evils that occur later, however remotely connected.

Omitted circumstances

Failing to mention relevant circumstances like ‘who’ or ‘when’ or ‘where’ and so on, leads to another kind of apparent enthymeme. If a speaker says it was only right that a thief should have been punished, but he doesn’t mention who administered the punishment, he is deriving his argument from this false topic.

19 Refutation

Refutation is destroying an opponent's argument by showing that it is false or improbable. An argument may be refuted in two ways: either by bringing a counter-enthymeme or by bringing an objection.

Counter-enthymemes

A counter-enthymeme is an enthymeme that proves the contrary of the opponent's conclusion. If he argues that something is good, we show that it is bad; if he argues that something is bad, we show that it is good. Counter-enthymemes are drawn from the very same topic as the enthymeme being refuted. This can be done because the materials from which enthymemes are constructed are probable, and many probable things are contrary to one another. For example, if an opponent argues, "Morphine is good because it relieves pain", we can use the counter-enthymeme, "Morphine is bad because it causes addiction". His enthymeme is based on the topic that what removes an evil is good, and ours is based on the contrary of the same topic that what causes an evil is evil.

Objections

An objection is not an enthymeme. It is a statement that is contrary to a proof statement used by the opponent. Objections can be drawn from four sources:

1. The opponent's own argument.
2. Something similar.
3. Something contrary.
4. Previous decisions.

Objections from the argument

Objections from the opponent's own argument may be made in two ways: by a general objection, or by a particular objection.

A general objection is made by denying what the opponent asserts or by asserting what the opponent denies, but in reference to a subject that is more general than his subject and includes it. For example, if the opponent says (as part of his argument), "All politicians are truthful", we object with, "No man is truthful". If he says, "No politician is truthful", we object with, "All men are truthful". We do the same thing if he makes statements about particular subjects, for example, "John is truthful". We could object with either, (if John is a politician), "No politician is truthful", or, "No man is truthful".

A particular objection is made by denying what the opponent asserts or asserting what the opponent denies, but in reference to a subject that is more particular than his subject and is included in it. For example, if the opponent says, "All politicians are truthful", we object with, "John is not truthful". If he says, "No politician is truthful", we object with, "John is truthful".

Objections from contraries

An objection from what is contrary is made by denying of the contrary subject the contrary of what the opponent asserts. For example, if our opponent claims, "The

good man does good to all his friends”, we object with, “But the evil man does not do harm to all his friends”.

Objections from similars

An objection from what is similar is made by denying of the contrary subject something similar to what the opponent asserts. For example, if our opponent claims, “Those who have been injured always hate those who injure them”, we object with, “But those who have been helped do not always love those who helped them”.

Objections from previous decisions

An objection from previous decisions is made by showing that a well known authority has on a previous occasion denied what our opponent asserts. For example, if our opponent claims that we should make allowances for those who are drunk because their offence is the result of ignorance, we object by reminding our listeners that judge so-and-so advocated a severer penalty for a man who commits a crime when drunk.

Using objections

We have seen that logical arguments are constructed in four ways: from probabilities, examples, signs and necessary signs.

Arguments from probabilities can always be attacked by bringing an objection because a probability is not what occurs without exception but only mostly; and what is true for the most part is open to an objection, otherwise it would not be probable but necessary. But often the objection is not real but only apparent because the objector proves that the argument is not necessary instead of proving that it is not probable.

A defender always has an advantage over the accuser when he uses this fallacy because the accuser uses probable arguments and the defender proves that they are not necessary. But the judge thinks he has proved that they are not probable. Showing that an argument is not necessary is not the same as showing that it is not probable, and showing that a probable argument is not necessary does not refute it. To refute a probable argument we must show that it is not probable.

We can show that an argument is not probable if we base our objection on what generally happens, and we can do this by referring either to times or to instances in which what our opponent claims to be is not so. The strongest objection combines them both, for the more numerous the instances the more probable the thing.

Arguments based on examples may be refuted in the same manner as those from probabilities. If we have a single instance that is contrary to our opponent’s examples, his argument is shown to be not necessary, even though he has more instances supporting his side.

If we have more instances or more frequent occurrences on our side we can prove that his argument is not probable, but if he has more instances or occurrences on his side we must contend that the present case is not like the examples he gives, or that it did not happen in the same way, or that there is some other difference.

Arguments based on signs, even if the signs are true, can be refuted in the ways shown at the beginning. But arguments based on necessary signs cannot be refuted because necessary signs always produce a necessary conclusion. The only things we can do against them is to prove that the alleged sign is nonexistent.

PART 2 – DISCOVERY OF NON-LOGICAL PROOF

20 Non-logical proof

A speaker uses rhetoric to influence his listeners' decisions about what is expedient or harmful, about what is noble or disgraceful, and about whether someone is guilty or innocent.

We have learnt how to influence our listeners's decisions by using logical proofs. Now we will learn how to do it by using moral proofs and emotional proofs.

To influence listeners' decisions by using moral proof we show them that we have certain moral qualities and that we are well disposed towards them. This gives them confidence in us and inclines them believe what we say.

Moral proof is very useful in deliberative rhetoric because the more worthy the listeners think the speaker is and the better disposed towards them, the more readily will they believe him. This is true in general, but especially when they have nothing by which they can form an opinion on the subject by themselves. The less certain they are of themselves the more readily will they believe someone in whom they have confidence.

To influence listeners' decisions by using al proofs we arouse certain s in them to put them into certain states of mind. This affects the way they make their decisions.

al proof is more useful in judicial rhetoric because listeners change their opinions and make decisions quite differently depending on whether they love or hate, or whether they are angry or calm. When a man is favourably disposed towards someone he has to judge, he thinks the accused has either committed no offence at all or that it is trifling. But if he hates the accused, he thinks the opposite.

al proof is also useful in deliberative rhetoric because things appear different to listeners, either altogether different or different in degree, when they are in an al state of mind. For example, if a listener is made confident about getting something, he will convince himself that he is sure to get it, and if he is made to desire it, he will convince himself that it is good.

21 Moral proof

We persuade with our moral character by showing our listeners that we have good practical judgment, moral virtue, and goodwill.

If we do not show good practical judgment, they may think that our opinions are false.

If we do not show moral virtue, they may think that even if our opinions are true, our statements are false.

And if we do not show goodwill towards them, they may suspect that even if we are not giving them false advice, we are keeping the best advice to ourselves.

So these three qualities are all that we need, and if we show that we have them, our listeners will believe what we say.

We show our listeners we have goodwill towards them by speaking of our friendship for them and of our concern for their needs. These things will be discussed in detail

when we consider the emotions of friendship and pity.

We show we have good practical judgment and moral virtue by showing that we have the things for which people are praised. Listeners will believe us good and others good for the same reasons. We saw these things when we discussed the noble and praise.

But because we ought not praise ourselves, since that would appear to be boasting, we have to show our virtue in other ways. We can do it by the style of our speech, by using moral maxims, and by making others speak in our place, as it were, by quoting their opinions.

Style of speech shows our moral character because each type of person has an associated manner of speaking. A courageous man will not speak the same way as a coward. We will see this in detail when we consider appropriate speech in the section on style.

Moral maxims show our moral character because they express our moral preferences, and if these are good our character appears good too. We have already considered maxims.

22 Emotional proof

Emotions are affections of the mind that influence our opinions about the goodness or badness of things. We judge the same things quite differently according to whether we are angry or calm, afraid or confident, and so on.

To arouse an emotion in our listeners we must urge them to the state of mind of those affected by the emotion by making statements to show them that:

1. They are the kind of people likely to be affected by the emotion, and
2. They are being affected by the kind of people and things that usually arouse the emotion.

For example, to arouse fear in our listeners we might state that they are being seriously threatened by someone who is both powerful and ruthless and that they themselves are entirely without defence or help.

These statements are the same signs and probabilities we would use for logical proofs, and they are found in the same way, that is, by searching the topics. But we do not use them the same way. We do not put them into the form of a logical argument because reason and emotion act against one another. A logical argument, requiring an act of the reason tends to destroy emotion rather than arouse it.

However, if we wish to argue logically rather than emotionally and convince listeners that someone was or will be affected by a certain emotion, we can construct enthymemes in the usual way from the topics of the emotions.

23 Anger

Anger is a desire for revenge arising from the pain of a real or apparent undeserved slight. It is directed against an individual who has done or is about to do something

against us or against one of our friends. Anger is always accompanied by the pleasure of the thought of revenge.

We slight someone by showing that we consider him worthless. One way of doing this is by ignoring him instead of giving him our attention. This shows that we think he is unimportant.

Another way of slighting him is to place obstacles in the way of his wishes, not for our gain, but for his loss. This shows we neither fear him nor think his friendship of any use.

Another way of slighting a person is to insult him, that is, to cause him an injury of annoyance that dishonours him. It is not given as a punishment, but just for the pleasure of giving it.

Dishonour slights a person because it tries to reduce his value and make him appear worthless. Men think they have the right to be respected by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, education and anything else that makes one man superior to another. For example, the rich man wants to be respected by the poor man, the ruler wants to be respected by the subject, the teacher wants to be respected by the pupil, and so on. So whenever the superior is dishonoured by the inferior he feels insulted and slighted.

Subjects of anger

Men get angry if they are trying to get something and are pained because they are opposed. For instance, if a man is thirsty and another prevents him drinking, either directly or indirectly, or even only appears to do so, or refuses to assist him, or troubles him in any other way while he is in the state of thirst, then he will be angry with that person.

Again, men are angry when something turns out contrary to their expectations. And the more unexpected the outcome, the more they are pained and prone to anger, just as they are all the happier the more unexpectedly something turns out well.

Objects of anger

We are angered by these people:

1. Those who ridicule, mock and scoff at us.
2. Those who injure us in ways that indicate insult, that is, not in retaliation or to gain an advantage.
3. Those who speak ill of or despise things we consider most important, especially if we suspect we do not possess them.
4. Those who are our friends, rather than those who are not, if they ill-treat us.
5. Those who have always treated us well, if they no longer do so.
6. Those who do not return a kindness, or do not return it fully.
7. Those inferiors who oppose us.
8. Those we believe by rights should treat us well, when they do not.

9. Friends who do not speak well of us or treat us well; the more so if they do the opposite.
10. Friends who fail to perceive that we want something of them.
11. Those who rejoice or are cheerful when we are unfortunate.
12. Those who do not care if they pain us.
13. Those who listen in if our faults are recounted; or those who are indifferent if this is done.
14. Those who slight persons we would be disgraced not to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives and dependants.
15. Those who do not return our greetings.
16. Those who employ irony when we are serious; irony shows contempt.
17. Those who forget our name or such things; forgetfulness shows indifference, and indifference is a slight.
18. We are more angry with those who are of no account, if they slight us.
19. And we are more angry with those who slight us before our rivals for honour, those we admire, those by whom we would like to be admired, those we respect and those who respect us.

Causing anger

Whenever we want to make our listeners angry, we must put them in the frame of mind of those who are inclined to be angry and show them that those we want them to be angry with are the kind of people that make men angry and are responsible for the things that make men angry.

24 Calmness

Calmness is the opposite of anger, and calming is the opposite of making angry; it is the quieting and appeasing of anger.

Subjects of calmness

Persons likely to be calm are:

1. Those who are free from want or pain, whose condition is opposite to those likely to be angry; those who are laughing or enjoying prosperity and success.
2. Those whose anger is not fresh, for time appeases anger.
3. Those moved by pity, especially if the object of their anger has suffered more than they would have inflicted.
4. Those who believe they deserve what they suffer.

Objects of calmness

We are calmed by these people:

1. Those who do not intentionally slight us, or who admit their slight and tell us they are sorry.
2. Those who humble themselves and do not contradict us, or who ask us not to be angry.

3. Those who refrain from slighting anyone, or any worthy person, or anyone who resembles ourselves.
4. Those we respect or fear; it is impossible to be afraid and angry at the same time.
5. Those who acted in anger, because then they do not seem to have intended to slight us.
6. Those who really intended the opposite of what they did.
7. Those who are serious with us when we are serious.
8. Those who usually respect us.
9. Those who have rendered us services greater than their disservices.

Causing calmness

Whenever we wish to calm our listeners' anger, we must represent those with whom they are angry as formidable, or deserving of respect, or as benefactors, or as having acted involuntarily, or as being very grieved at what they have done, and so on.

25 Fear

Fear is a painful feeling caused by the impression of a close evil that causes pain or destruction. We flee what we fear.

We do not fear all evils, but only evils that involve great pain or destruction. No one fears becoming unjust or slow-witted. Nor do we fear things that are very remote, but only those that are near at hand and threatening; we all know that we must die, but as death does not seem close, we are not afraid of it.

Objects of fear

We are moved to fear by these things:

1. Things that seem to have great power of destroying or inflicting painful injuries.
2. Signs of danger, such as the enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any way. Since they have the wish to injure us, they can't be far away from doing so.
3. Injustice coupled with power, because the unjust man is unjust by deliberate inclination.
4. Fear felt by those able to injure us in any way, for they are ready to act.
5. Being at the mercy of another. Most men are bad rather than good; they are slaves of greed and are cowards in time of danger, so being at their mercy is something to be feared.
6. Those who have been wronged, or think they have; because they are on the look-out for an opportunity for revenge.
7. Those who have done some wrong are to be feared when they have power, because they are afraid of retaliation, and their fear is something to be feared.
8. Our rivals for the same things when they cannot be shared, because we are always contending with them.

9. Those who are feared, or ought to be feared by people who are stronger than ourselves, because if they can harm stronger people, they can harm us all the more.
10. Those who have destroyed people stronger than us.
11. Those who have attacked people weaker than us, because they will attack us when they have grown stronger.
12. Of those we have wronged or who are our enemies or rivals, it is not the hot-headed or outspoken who are to be feared, but the mild-mannered and unscrupulous, because we never know whether they are about to act or not.
13. We have more reason to fear when our mistakes cannot be put right, or hardly so, or because their putting right is no longer in our power but in the power of our opponent.
14. Anything which moves people to pity when it happens or is about to happen to others.

Subjects of fear

People likely to be afraid are: Those who are likely to suffer anything; so they fear either the thing they expect, or the persons from whom they expect it, or the times at which they expect it. They are the opposites to the subjects of confidence.

People not likely to be afraid are:

1. Those who are, or seem to be, highly prosperous. Because of their wealth, strength, power or friends, they are insolent, contemptuous and rash.
2. Those who have, or think they have, suffered all possible evils, and are indifferent about the future. No one is afraid unless there is at least some hope of escape. When we are afraid, we try to work out how to avoid the evil, but when things are hopeless, we do not even try to think about escape.

Causing fear

Whenever we want to make our listeners fear, we must make them believe they are likely to suffer. We do this by reminding them that people as great or greater than they have suffered or are suffering, and suffering at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it, and in a manner or at a time they did not expect.

26 Confidence

Confidence is the contrary of fear, and the causes of confidence are contrary to the causes of fear.

Confidence is the expectation of what is helpful, with the impression that it is close, while what is harmful is far-off or non-existent.

Subjects of confidence

Persons likely to be confident are:

1. Those who believe they have often succeeded and have not suffered.
2. Those who have been in danger and escaped.
3. Those who believe they are equal to or superior to others who are not afraid.

We think ourselves superior to another when we have bettered him or his equal or his superior.

4. Those who believe they possess more or greater advantages than their opponents, such as wealth, strength, friends, and all the most important weapons. Those who believe they have no rivals, or only weak ones; or if they have powerful rivals, they are such who are friendly, or who have done them favours, or received favours from them.
6. Those who believe they have wronged no one, or only a few, or none that need be feared.
7. Those who believe they have good luck or good fortune, especially if they think they have some sign of this.
8. Those who think their interests are shared by the majority, or by those with the greater power, or both.
9. Those who begin an undertaking with no thought of present or future failure, or with hope of complete success.

Objects of confidence

The things that cause confidence are the opposites of the things that cause fear. In general, we are moved to confidence by these:

1. Remoteness of fearful things.
2. Nearness of helpful things.
3. Possibility of remedies.
4. Existence of great or many means of help.

27 Friendship and enmity

Love

There are two kinds of love: love of desire, and love of friendship. Love of desire is wishing for ourselves the things we believe to be good, and obtaining them for ourselves as far as we are able.

On the other hand, love of friendship, or goodwill, is wishing for another the things we believe to be good, and obtaining them for him as far as we are able, and this for his sake and not for our own. Goodwill alone is not sufficient for friendship, because we can have goodwill towards someone who does not know us, but we cannot have friendship unless we know each other.

Friendship

Friendship is loving and being loved in return, and those who think they have a relation of this kind think themselves friends. There are many kinds of friendship: companionship, marriage, kinship, and so on.

Friends have the same ideas of good and evil; they love and hate the same things. So one who wishes for another what he wishes for himself seems to be his friend.

Subjects and objects of friendship

Persons who are friendly, and with whom we are inclined to be friendly are:

1. Those who share our joy in good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our sake and for no other reason. All are happy when they get what they want and are sad when the opposite occurs, so their joy and sorrow on our account are signs of their friendly wishes for us.
2. Those who have done us or our friends some good, especially if the service was considerable, or given readily, or done at a time of particular need—provided it was done for our sake.
3. Those whom we think desire to do us some good.
4. Those whose friends are our friends; those who like the people we like; and those who are liked by the people we like.
5. Those whose enemies are our enemies; those who dislike the people we dislike; and those who are disliked by the people we dislike.
6. Those who are ready to help others with money or protection. This is why men honour those who are liberal, or courageous, or just.
7. Those who are temperate, because they are not likely to be unjust to others; and those who do not meddle in the affairs of others, for the same reason.
8. Those with whom we wish to be friends, if they appear to want our friendship. These are people who are virtuous and those who have a good reputation among all generally, or among the best people, or among those we admire and who admire us.
9. Those who are pleasant to live with or spend time with, that is, those who are good tempered and who do not find fault with our mistakes or pick quarrels and arguments.
10. Those who are good at making and taking jokes.
11. Those who praise our good qualities, especially the qualities we are afraid we do not possess.
12. Those who are not offensive in person, dress or behaviour.
13. Those who do not reproach us with our mistakes or with what they have done for us.
14. Those who do not bear grudges or grievances, but are ready to make up. We think they will behave this way to ourselves too.
15. Those who do not want to know about or speak about our faults, or the faults of others, but only about our good points.
16. Those who do not oppose us when we are angry or serious; to do so would show aggression towards us.
17. Those who show good feelings towards us, for instance, if they admire us, think good of us, and take pleasure in our company, especially in regard to things for which we want particularly to be admired or thought worthy or agreeable.
18. Those who resemble us or have the same tastes, provided that their interests

- do not clash with ours, and provided they do not make their living the same way as we do. If they did, professional jealousies would arise.
19. Those who desire the same things as we do, provided it is possible for us to share them, otherwise the same problem as the last would arise.
 20. Those before whom we are not ashamed to break mere convention; and those before whom we are ashamed to commit real wrong.
 21. Those who are our rivals, and those we wish would imitate us, but not envy us.
 22. Those who are prepared to help obtain some good, provided that doing so does not bring us a greater evil.
 23. Those who have as much regard for their friends when they are absent as when they are present. This is why we like those who are faithful to their dead friends.
 24. Those who are really fond of their friends and do not desert them in trouble. We are most friendly to those who themselves are good friends.
 25. Those who are honest with us and are not afraid to speak to us about our faults.
 26. Those of whom we are not afraid and in whom we have confidence. No one can like a person he fears.

Causing friendliness

Whenever we want to make our listeners friendly towards someone, we must show them that he has done them favours, and done them unasked, and not made them public after doing them, and so on.

These things show that he has done them for their sake and not for his own.

Enmity

Enmity is the opposite of friendship as hatred is the opposite of love. The people likely to be enemies are the opposites of those who are likely to be friends.

28 Shame and shamelessness

Shame is a kind of pain or uneasiness at past, present or future misdeeds that seem likely to bring us dishonour. It leads us to turn away from such misdeeds. Shamelessness is contempt for or indifference to these same things.

Objects of shame—Things

We are moved to shame by all actions which because they are due to vice seem to be disgraceful for ourselves or for those we love, such as:

1. Throwing down one's weapons and taking to flight; this is due to cowardice.
2. Stealing money; this is due to injustice.
3. Illicit relations with someone; this is due to intemperance.
4. Making profit out of what is petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, the poor or the dead; refusing to assist with money when we can afford it; giving less than we can afford; accepting money from those less able than ourselves to

afford it; begging from others who are themselves in need; and so on; all these things are due to avarice and meanness.

5. Praising others in their presence; overpraising their good points and playing down their bad points; making an excessive show of sympathy with another's grief; and so on; these things are due to flattery.
6. Avoiding work that is accepted by those who are less fitted to do it because they are older, more delicate or of a higher rank; and so on; this is due to effeminacy.
7. Accepting favours from others, and often, and then abusing them for giving the favours; this is due to little-mindedness.
8. Speaking about oneself at great length; making extravagant claims; taking credit for the work of others; and so on; this is due to boastfulness.

The same is true for every other vice, the actions that flow from them, and the things that resemble them. They are all disgraceful, and should make us ashamed.

We are also ashamed of allowing, or being likely to allow to be done to us things that bring on us dishonour or blame. Yielding to another's disgraceful actions is itself disgraceful, whether it is done voluntarily or involuntarily, as when giving in to force, since lack of resistance and meek submission are due to cowardice.

And we are ashamed, not only of these disgraceful things, but even of signs of them; not only of sensual excesses, but of any indication of them; and not only of doing disgraceful things but even of speaking of them.

Another way of being moved to shame is by not having a share in the honourable things shared by all men, or all or most of those like ourselves, such as education and the like. Those like ourselves are those of the same nationality, or of the same locality, or of the same family, or of the same age, or in general, those who are in some way our equal. It is disgraceful not to have an equal share with them of the same things. And these deficiencies are all the more disgraceful if they are seen to be due to our own fault or moral weakness.

Objects of shame—Persons

We are not ashamed of our actions before all persons equally. We do not feel shame at all before those whose opinions of truth we despise—no one ever feels shame before children or animals. Before those we know, we feel shame because of actions that appear really wrong but not for actions that are disapproved only by convention. On the other hand, before strangers, we do not feel shame except for actions that are conventionally wrong.

So we feel shame for the disgrace our actions bring only before those whose opinions we respect. They are:

1. Those we esteem; and these are:
 - a) those who admire us.
 - b) those we admire, because they possess something greatly esteemed,

- or because they have something we badly want and they can give.
- c) those we wish would admire us, for the same reasons.
 - d) those who compete with us because they are like us.
 - e) those whose opinion we do not despise, such as men of practical wisdom and experience, our elders, and those who are well educated.
2. Those who cannot be accused of the same faults as ours; it is evident that their inclinations are to the contrary.
 3. Those who are not slow to reproach apparent wrongdoers. Since a man is presumed not to reproach others with what he himself does, if he does reproach others with something, he does not commit it himself.
 4. Those who are generally fond of gossiping.
 5. Those given to slander, because if they dishonour the innocent, they will dishonour the guilty all the more.
 6. Those who make it their business to look for the faults of others, such as mockers and satirists.
 7. Those who ask for something for the first time, such as those who have recently sought our friendship.
 8. Those old acquaintances who know nothing against us.
 9. Those who will reveal our faults to all the above, such as our employees, servants or acquaintances.
 10. We are all the more ashamed before those who see our wrongdoing with their own eyes in broad daylight.
 11. And we are more ashamed before those likely to be always with us, or who keep watch over us, because in both cases we are under their eyes.

Subjects of shame

Persons likely to be ashamed are:

1. Those who are connected with actions or things which entail disgrace, and for which they or their ancestors, or any others closely connected with them are responsible; for instance, their children or their pupils.
2. Those whose disgraceful actions are seen or known, or are likely to be seen or known by persons before whom men feel shame, that is: those who admire them; those they admire; those they wish would admire them, or from whom they want something they will not get if they lose their reputation.
3. Those who are rivals of others like them; because they do or not do many things on account of the shame their rivals evoke.
4. Those who have to be seen by and openly associate with those who are aware of their disgrace.

Shamelessness

Shamelessness can be understood as the opposite to shame and it can be caused by the opposite causes.

29 Goodwill and ill-will

Goodwill is the affection that leads us to render a service or favour to someone in need, in his interests only, without expecting a return. Friendship, in contrast, does expect a return of friendship.

Objects of goodwill

We are moved to acts of goodwill by those who have needs or desires for the things whose absence entails mental or bodily pain or suffering, such as those in love, or those in pain or danger.

The favour will be all the greater if the person needing it is in pressing need, or if the service, or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the one who gives it is the only one, or the first to give it, or has given it to the highest degree.

Subjects of goodwill

People act from goodwill when they render a service or do a favour without any return for themselves. Their only motive is to relieve the other's need.

So to prove that someone is acting from goodwill, we must show that the one party was or is in pain or need, and that the other is rendering the service in such time of need.

To prove that someone is not doing a favour or acting from goodwill, we must show that they acted for their own sake, or that what they did was merely by chance, or that they acted under compulsion, or that they were returning a favour, not making a gift.

Causing goodwill and ill-will

We can secure goodwill by moving listeners to friendship or pity.

Speakers cause ill-will by exciting feelings of indignation, envy, jealousy or hatred.

30 Pity

Pity is the pain we feel on learning that someone who does not deserve it suffers a fatal or painful evil. His suffering is present, imminent or recent; and it is something we think could easily happen to us or to one of our friends.

Pity is different to fear, which arises when the evil is actually threatening us. When this happens, fear for our own safety drives out our pity and arouses an opposite emotion in us.

Subjects of pity

Persons likely to feel pity are:

1. Those who think they or one of their friends are likely to suffer a fatal or painful evil.
2. Those who have already suffered and escaped.
3. Those who are advanced in age, wisdom and experience.
4. Those who are weak.

5. Those who are timid.
6. Those who are well educated, because they reckon rightly.
7. Those who have parents, wives or children; for these are part of them and are liable to suffer.
8. Those who are not angry or confident; persons affected by these emotions do not worry about the future, while the person who pities does.
9. Those who are not wantonly insolent; these do not take thought of the future either.
10. Those who are not in great fear. The fearful are so preoccupied with their own emotion that they cannot pity others.
11. Those who believe that at least some men are good; for if a man thinks all are evil, he thinks all deserve misfortune and none deserve pity.

Objects of pity

We are moved to pity by these things and persons:

1. All painful and destructive things, such as death by various causes, personal ill-treatment and injury, old age, disease and hunger.
2. All evils due to misfortune, such as lack of friends, or few friends, (so it is pitiable to be separated from friends), ugliness, deformity, mutilation and weakness, especially if these misfortunes are great, or if they come from where we might have expected something good; or if the good did not come until after the evil was suffered and it was too late.
3. Those we know, provided they are not too closely related. If we are closely related, we feel as though we ourselves are threatened with suffering, and this is fear.
4. Those who resemble us in age, character, habits, position or family. Relations like these make us think the same misfortune might easily befall us as well.
5. Those who by gesture, voice, dress and general behaviour make us see the evil as present or just past or just about to happen, rather than long past or far in the future.
6. Those who in their suffering show themselves to be men of good character, because then the suffering appears to be all the more undeserved and the man all the more deserving of pity.

31 Indignation

Indignation is the pain we feel on learning that someone who does not deserve it is enjoying good fortune.

Objects of indignation

It is not every kind of good that causes indignation; we are not indignant if a man becomes honest or brave, any more than we pity him if he ceases to be these things. Rather, indignation is caused by those goods, such as money and power, that are

normally given only to those who are already good, or to those who have natural advantages like noble birth or beauty.

We are likely to be indignant with these persons on account of those goods:

1. Undeserving persons acquiring some good and prospering because of it. If their good fortune is of long standing, or is inherited, it causes less indignation because it then resembles something natural, and what is natural seems to belong to them.
2. Deserving people who do not obtain what is fitting for them. Not every kind of good thing is appropriate to whoever claims it; for instance, fine weapons are not suitable to a musician (however accomplished) but to a courageous warrior; and distinguished marriages are suitable, not to the newly rich, but to the nobly born. Whenever a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable for him we feel indignant.
3. An inferior contending with a superior, especially if they are engaged in the same occupation, such as the beginner sportsman challenging the champion; or if their occupations are not the same, any inferior contending with the superior in anything at all, for instance, the wrestler arguing law with a judge. Law is superior to wrestling.

Subjects of indignation

Persons likely to be indignant are:

1. Those who deserve or possess the greatest advantages, because they consider it unjust that those who do not resemble them should be thought worthy of the same good things.
2. Those who are virtuous, because they both judge rightly about others and hate what is unjust.
3. Those who are ambitious and want to obtain certain positions, especially if unworthy people have obtained them.
4. Those who think themselves worthy of any advantages and others unworthy of them.

Persons not likely to be indignant are those who are servile and unambitious, because they do not think themselves worthy of anything.

32 Envy

Envy is the pain we feel at the sight of someone possessing things we dearly want to possess. The other person must be our equal and like, and the pain must be due to the fact that the other possesses the goods we desire for ourself.

Envy is different to the sorrow we feel when an enemy prospers. We see this as a threat to ourselves and are sorry and afraid. But envy makes us see the other's good as lessening our own good name or excellence.

Envy is always evil and a hindrance to pity because it makes us grieve over what should make us rejoice—our neighbour's good.

Just as the envious are pained at not possessing certain things, so they rejoice when they do possess them.

Subjects of envy

Persons likely to be envious are:

1. Those who have, or seem to have, equals; such as equals in birth, relationships, age, character, reputation and possessions.
2. Those who seem to fall short of having everything by only a little. So those who attempt great things and succeed are envious, because they imagine everyone is trying to deprive them of what is theirs.
3. Those who are honoured for something, especially for wisdom or good fortune.
4. Those who are ambitious.
5. Those who love a reputation for knowledge and wisdom.
6. Those who wish to be distinguished in anything; they will be envious in regard to it.
7. The little-minded, because to them everything appears great.

Objects of envy

We are moved to envy by these things and persons:

1. Actions or possessions that lead to honour, fame and glory, and all goods of fortune, especially if we want those things themselves, or think we have a right to them, or think that having them or not having them makes us a little better or worse than another.
2. Those who rival us because they are near to us in time, place, age and reputation.
3. Those who succeed rapidly when we succeed only with difficulty.
4. Those whose possessions or successes are a reproach to us, because they show up our own fault in not obtaining the same advantages.
5. Those who have or have acquired what was ours by nature or acquisition. So an older man becomes envious of a younger man.
6. Those who obtain with little expense what we obtained only at great expense.

33 Jealousy

Jealousy is pain we feel when we see someone possessing things we dearly want to possess. The other must be our equal and like; the things must be obtainable by us; and the pain must be due to the fact that we ourselves do not possess the goods, rather than the fact that the other does possess them. The opposite to jealousy is contempt.

Subjects of jealousy

Persons likely to be jealous are:

1. Those who believe they have a claim to the goods they do not possess.

No one claims what seems impossible. So the young and ambitious are jealous.

2. Those who possess advantages worthy of honourable men, such as wealth, friends, position, and so on. They believe that it is their duty to be good, and that these goods ought to belong to the good, so they strive to obtain them.
3. Those whom everybody thinks deserving of goods.

Objects of jealousy

We are moved to jealousy by these things and persons:

1. Honours obtained by ancestors, relatives, friends, countrymen or associates; because we see ourselves also as being worthy of these honours and entitled to them.
2. Virtues, and useful things; because virtuous men and benefactors are honoured. Jealousy for virtue is itself good.
3. All goods which others can enjoy with us, such as wealth and beauty, rather than things like health which we enjoy alone.
4. Those who possess good things such as courage, wisdom and power, because those who possess them can do good to many others.
5. Those whom many want to be like.
6. Those whom many want to have as their acquaintances.
7. Those who are admired by many others and by ourselves.
8. Those who are praised by writers and speakers.

34 Characters

Since all men are willing to listen to speeches that are in harmony with their own character, and to listen to speakers who are similar to themselves, we must study the various characters of men so that we can employ language that makes us and our speech appear to be of one character or another.

We need make only broad distinctions, describing characters according to emotions, habits, ages and fortunes, for it is these things that determine what interests our listeners.

By emotions we mean anger, desire and the like, that we have just seen. By habits we mean the various virtues and vices we saw in the section dealing with display rhetoric, as well as the kinds of things that individual men choose and do. By ages we mean youth, maturity and old age, and by fortune we mean the goods that produce certain characteristics in men. These are noble birth, wealth, power and their contraries.

The young

By habit, the young are disposed to desire, and to do what they desire. They are simple minded rather than evil minded because they have not yet seen much evil, and they are confiding because they have not yet been often deceived.

In their activities they pursue noble goods rather than the useful because their

life is guided by their ideals rather than by calculation. Calculation aims at what is useful, while virtue aims at what is noble.

All their mistakes are due to their great vehemence and their neglect of the rule of never going to extremes. They do everything to excess: love, hate and everything else, and they do this because they think, and affirm, that they know everything. Their wrongdoing is due to insolence rather than to viciousness.

They are unable to control their desire for bodily sensual pleasure; but their desires are very changeable, and while they desire with great intensity, they soon tire and grow cool because their will, like the appetite of the sick, is keen rather than great.

The young are full of hope because hope is concerned with the future, as memory is concerned with the past; and for the young the future is long and the past is short. In the morning of their life it is not possible for them to remember anything, but they readily hope for everything, and this makes them easy to deceive. And they are full of daring as well as hope. Daring prevents them fearing, and hope gives them confidence. No one fears when he is daring, and the hope of some advantage makes one confident.

The young have high ideals because they have not yet been humbled by life nor yet have they had to face up to necessity. Besides, magnanimity consists in believing oneself worthy of great things, and this attitude is found in someone full of hope. And because they desire superiority, they love honours and especially victory, because victory is a kind of superiority.

Their desire for money is less than their desire for honour and victory. They attach little importance to it because they have not yet experienced want.

They are emotional and quick tempered; they readily follow their impulses and are unable to control their anger. This is because they are ambitious and cannot stand being slighted, and so they become indignant when they think they are being wronged.

They are inclined to pity because they measure others by their own innocence, and judging that all men are better than they really are, they think that others suffer without deserving to.

At this time of life more than at any other they are fond of friends and companions, because they take pleasure in company and judge nothing by expediency, not even their friends. They are fond of laughter and the wit which is cultured insolence.

They are easily shamed because they have been educated by convention only, and as yet do not understand that there are other things that are noble.

The old

Older men and those who have passed their prime usually have characters that are contrary to those of the young. There is more calculation than moral character in their lives, because calculation is concerned with what is useful, and moral character is concerned with virtue.

They are cynical because cynicism consists in putting the worse interpretation on things, and they always suspect evil because they mistrust, and they mistrust because of their experience.

They have lived many years. They have been deceived many times by others and have made many mistakes themselves. They find that most human things turn out badly, so they are positive about nothing. They always ‘think’ rather than ‘know’, and always qualify their statements with ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’. Rather than over-doing things they under-do everything, and if they commit acts of injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence.

Their outbursts of anger are sharp but weak, and while some of their desires are weak, others have ceased altogether, so that they neither feel them nor act from them; rather, they act only from motives of gain. So men of this age appear to be self-controlled because their desires no longer trouble them, but in fact they are slaves to gain.

For the same reasons they neither love nor hate strongly, but they tend to love as though they would one day have to hate, and hate as if they would one day have to love.

They are little-minded because they have been humbled by life. They desire nothing great or out of the ordinary, but only the necessities of life.

They are not generous because property is one of the necessities, and they know from experience how hard it is to get and how easy it is to lose. And they are unduly selfish, because this also is littleness of mind.

They are cowardly and pessimistic because their state of mind is contrary to that of the young. The young are hot but the aged are cold, and fear is a kind of coldness; so old age leads to cowardice.

Because of their cowardice they are not very hopeful for the future. Their experience too makes them this way, because they think things that happen are mostly bad or usually turn out for the worse.

They do not seek the noble but the expedient, because they are selfish. The expedient is good for the individual, while the noble is good without qualification.

They are shameless rather than modest, because they prefer the expedient to the noble, so they do not care what others think.

They live in memories rather than in hopes, because the life that is left to them is short and the life that is past is long. Hope belongs to the future and memories belong to the past. This is why they talk so much about the past—they take pleasure in recollection.

They are fond of life, especially in their last days, because desire is directed towards what is needed, and the strongest desire is directed towards the greatest need.

The old, like the young, are given to pity, but for different reasons. The young feel pity because they love others, the old feel pity because they are weak and think they are going to suffer all sorts of misfortune. This is one of the motives for pity.

For the same reason the old are full of complaints, and are neither witty nor fond of laughing. A complaining nature is the opposite to a happy one.

The mature

It is clear that the character of those in the prime of their life will be the mean between the other two when their excesses are removed. The body is most fully developed between thirty and thirty-five years of age, and the mind at about forty-nine.

At this age, men are neither over-confident nor over-fearful. They preserve a right attitude to both extremes, neither trusting nor distrusting all, and they judge everything in accordance with the facts rather than rashly.

They are neither wasteful of money nor ungenerous, but preserve a reasonable mean. Their rule of conduct is neither the noble nor the expedient alone, but both together.

It is the same with fear and desire. They combine courage with self control, whereas in the young and old these qualities are found separately; the young have courage but no self control, while the old have self control but no courage.

In general, all the advantages that the young and the old have separately, the mature possess combined. In all cases, the excess or deficiency in the other two is replaced by a due moderation.

This will suffice for the ages of men and the characters that belong to each. We will now consider the goods that are due to fortune, or at least those that produce certain characters in men.

Noble birth

The notion of noble birth refers to the excellence of race. It means that its members are of long standing, that its first members were famous as leaders, and that many of their descendents have been famous for qualities that are highly esteemed. The individual's noble birth can be derived from either the father's or the mother's side, providing there is legitimacy on both sides. The founders of his family were distinguished for virtue or wealth or any other of the things for which men are honoured, and several of the family—men and women, young and old—were famous persons. This notion of noble birth is quite different to the notion of noble character—something that is not always possessed by those who have noble birth, because families can degenerate from their family type so that later descendants do not have the character of the founders.

A characteristic of noble birth is that they who have it are more ambitious. When men start out with any good they usually try to accumulate it, and noble birth is a heritage of honour from one's ancestors. Men of noble birth are prone to look down on even those who are just as important now as their own ancestors once were. They do this because the very same goods are more honourable and a cause of greater vanity when they belong to the distant past rather than when they are recent.

Wealth

The characteristics which accompany wealth are plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and arrogant. Their wealth affects their mind and they seem to think that they possess every good thing that exists. Wealth becomes a measure of value for them and they imagine there is nothing it cannot buy.

They are luxurious, because they live in luxury and like to show off their prosperity. They are swaggerers and ill-mannered, because since men usually pay attention to what they like and admire, the wealthy imagine that everyone likes and admires the same things as they do. This feeling is not unreasonable, because if you have money, there are always many people begging it from you.

They believe they are worthy to rule others, because they believe they have the qualities that make them so. In a word, the type of character produced by wealth is that of a fortunate fool.

There is a difference worth noting between those who have been wealthy for a long time and those who are newly rich. The newly rich have all the vices of wealth in an exaggerated and worse form, because they have not been educated in the use of wealth, so to speak. Their acts of injustice are not due to an intention to injure their victims, but come from insolence and self indulgence.

Power

Nearly all the characteristics that come from power are as clear as those that come from wealth, because compared to them, some are the same, some are better.

Those in power are more ambitious and more manly in character than the wealthy, because they intend to carry out the great deeds their power permits. Their misdeeds are never petty, but great. They are more serious minded than the rich because they have to protect their power, and so they are always on the watch. They are dignified rather than arrogant, because their position makes them conspicuous, so they avoid excess. Their dignity is a mild and acceptable form of arrogance.

PART 3 – STYLE

35 Style

Logical proofs ought to be sufficient to persuade listeners and the manner in which a speaker presents his material ought not affect their decision. But most listeners are incapable of attending carefully to what the speaker is saying and making their decisions rationally. So the speaker has to overcome this debility by making his speech easy and pleasant to listen to; and to do this he needs a good style.

Style is needed for another reason. Moral proof depends on the speaker showing himself to be of a character that his listeners like and trust, and he does this mainly through his style.

We can see from this that since the whole purpose of style, like everything else in rhetoric, is to persuade the listeners, it is not enough to know what to say, we must also know how to say it, and attend to style, not as being right, but as being necessary.

Requirements of style

Good rhetorical style requires that the speech be clear, pleasant and appropriate. These three qualities are required not only in the choice of words and expressions but also in the delivery of the speech.

Speech must be *clear* because unless its meaning is easily understood it cannot be persuasive.

Speech should be *pleasant* because listeners are more easily persuaded when they are attentive to what the speaker says, and they are more attentive to the speech when they get pleasure from listening to it. In this regard speech is like people: those we know and are familiar with seem very ordinary and commonplace and we pay little attention to them, while foreigners excite our interest and wonder. Since what causes interest and wonder is pleasant, we will please our listeners and make them attentive if we avoid dull and plain-sounding speech and make it fresh and ‘foreign-sounding’ by elevating it above the ordinary.

Speech must be *appropriate* because while there are many ways to elevate it above the ordinary not all of them are suitable for rhetoric. Many of the things that elevate speech also make it poetical. Not that poetical style is unpleasant—it might well be quite otherwise—but the departures from ordinary speech that sound natural in poetry make spoken prose sound unnatural. But what is natural persuades and what is unnatural does not persuade. Listeners become suspicious if they think the speaker is setting a trap for them. So when we are elevating our speech to make it interesting and pleasant we must be careful to conceal the methods we use. We do that mainly by keeping our speech appropriate.

These are the principal qualities needed for a good rhetorical style. If the speaker manages well there will be something fresh and foreign about his speech, the art by which he achieves that will not be seen and above all his meaning will be clear.

Rhetorical styles

We should observe that there are different kinds of style. The written style is different to the spoken style, and the spoken style used in the law courts is different to the spoken style used in public debate.

The written style is usually precise and is unsuitable for public debate because it sounds thin when delivered.

The spoken style, no matter how good it sounds in debate, looks amateurish in writing. Disjointed sentences and frequently repeated words are rightly disapproved in writing, but they lend themselves to speaking. So speeches intended for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not perform their proper function and look silly.

Each kind of rhetoric calls for its own kind of style, and the same speaker will not excel in all three styles

Deliberative rhetoric requires a style like a rough sketch. A lot of detail is superfluous and even a disadvantage. The greater the number of listeners the broader the treatment should be, and where delivery is most effective, the style should be least finished.

Judicial rhetoric requires a more finished style, especially when used before a single judge, for when listening to legal arguments the mind more readily sees what belongs to the subject and what does not.

Display rhetoric requires a style most like the written style because display speeches are often simply read aloud rather than delivered.

Delivery

The things sought by style must also be sought by delivery. Delivery has the same effect as acting, and good delivery is of the greatest importance in rhetoric. Speakers who have a good delivery often succeed over those who do not, even though their speech makes little sense.

In using the voice to deliver a speech there are three qualities to consider: volume, pitch and speed. None of these things can be determined arbitrarily, but must be made appropriate to the subject of the speech, the emotion of the speaker, and the character the speaker wishes to assume. It is the same with the length of the speech. Propriety does not consist in either brevity or lengthiness, but in what is appropriate to the speaker's purpose and the other circumstances. So in the same way, loudness and softness, shrillness and deepness, quickness and slowness must be made appropriate.

The speaker should not try to make everything correspond exactly. If the language is harsh, the voice, the features and everything else connected with language should not be equally harsh, otherwise the whole becomes obviously artificial. If we make them correspond in some ways but not in others, the art is not seen and the effect is achieved.

36 Clear speech

There are several things needed for clarity in speech: suitable terms must be used, the relation between words must be shown, and the speech should be constructed in periods.

Terms

Our meaning is made clear if we use specific terms rather than general terms. Fortune tellers use general terms to make their predictions on questions of fact, because when they are unclear they are more likely to be right.

We should avoid ambiguous terms unless we want to be ambiguous, like those who pretend to say something when they really have nothing to say.

Relation between words

The use of correct grammar is important to establish the relation between the words we use. Unless we use the correct number, gender and case of words, and follow the other rules of grammar, we risk being misunderstood.

Listeners should not be left unsure about to which word another belongs. For example, in the statement “The man who sings sometimes earns good money”, whether ‘sometimes’ belongs to ‘sings’ or ‘earns’, is not clear.

Joining two words with another word not equally suitable to both causes obscurity. For example, if we speak of ‘seeing’ both colour and sound we will not be clear. We should speak of ‘perceiving’ them, for this word can be used with both.

Another rule for clarity in speech is to keep related words together. The connection must be made while the listeners can still recall, and a new clause should not be introduced. For example, we cause obscurity if we say, “I intended after I had seen him and gained his agreement on the important points to set out”, rather than saying, “I intended to set out after I had seen him and gained his agreement on the important points”. We should say at the outset what we mean and not insert details in the middle.

Periods

Speech is either continuous or periodic. Continuous speech has no pauses for the sake of style but is joined all together by connecting particles and stops only when everything the speaker intended to say has been said. This style is unpleasant because while the listeners like to have an end in view, continuous speech seems to go on and on without an end.

Periodic speech is divided into periods. A period is speech that makes complete sense, has a beginning and an end clearly marked by the rhythm of the words, and has a length that allows it to be easily understood. The period must reach its completion together with the sense and not stop short before the meaning is complete.

A speech in periodic style is pleasant and easy to learn. It is easy to learn because it is measured, and this makes it easy to remember. It is pleasant because it is the opposite to what is endless. As each period ends, the listener believes he has acquired another part of the speech and that he is making progress towards securing the whole. To neither foresee nor reach the end of anything is unpleasant.

A period may be either simple or composed of clauses. The composite period is completed speech that is divided into two or three members, and easy to deliver in one breath. Clauses are one or another of the members. A simple period consists of only one clause.

Neither the period nor the clause should be too long or too short. If they are too short they can make the listener stumble because he is mentally moving towards what he imagines will be an end and he is brought to a sudden halt. If they are too long they can leave the listener behind, because while he mentally pauses at what he imagines will be an end, the speaker continues.

Very long periods take on the nature of continuous speech, and so they are unpleasant. Very short clauses do not even make a period, and the listener leaves the speaker far behind.

Clauses

Clauses of the periodic style are either simply divided from one another, or opposed, or linked together by some kind of likeness. An example of divided clauses is, “I have often admired those who organised the festivals / and arranged the gymnastic contests”.

Clauses are opposed when in each of two clauses, one contrary is brought close to another contrary, or the same word is coupled with two contraries. For example, “They were useful to both; to those who stayed and to those who followed” and, “To those who followed they gave more than they left behind; for those who stayed, they left enough in their town”. In these examples, “stayed” is contrary to “followed” and “more” is contrary to “enough”.

This kind of style is pleasing because contraries are easily understood, especially when they are placed side by side; and also because it resembles a logical argument, since refutation is made by bringing contraries together.

Clauses may be made like one another by giving them equal length or similar sounds. Similarity can occur at the beginning of the clauses or at the end of the clauses. The beginnings of clauses can be made similar by repeating a word or words, and the ends can be made similar by repeating the same word, or by using words that end in the same syllable.

All these figures may be found in the same period at once: antithesis, equality of clauses and similarity of endings.

37 Pleasant speech

Easy learning is naturally pleasing to everyone, so our listeners will be pleased if they think they have learned something. They will be especially pleased if they learn something quickly. So there are two ways of making speech pleasant: one is by giving information rapidly, and the other is by making listeners aware that they have learned something. We can give information rapidly by the way we use our words. We can make listeners aware that they have learned something by the use of enthymemes, antithesis and witticisms.

Some speakers have a natural capacity for giving pleasure through their speech; others must learn it by practice.

Words

The most important words in speech are nouns and verbs, and the clarity of our speech will depend largely on our choice of these. To make our speech clear, we should call each object and action by its proper and ordinary name.

But doing that creates a problem: while it helps make our speech clear, it also makes it sound ordinary and dull.

We can remove the dullness by using words that are not ordinary: unusual words, coined words, compound words and abbreviated words. But this cure introduces another problem: this kind of speech nearly always sounds ornate and artificial.

One way to avoid both these problems is to use ordinary words in new and fresh combinations.

Another and better way to avoid both problems is to call everything by an ordinary name, but not everything by its own name, that is, to sometimes, or often, use metaphors.

Metaphors

A metaphor is simply a word that properly belongs to one thing used as the name of another, as when I say, “John is a fox”. The word ‘fox’ properly belongs to the red-furred bushy-tailed animal, but in this statement it is used for a person. Any word used in this fashion is called a metaphor.

Metaphors are most important in rhetoric because they give speech freshness and clarity and make it pleasant. Ordinary words are not pleasing because they teach listeners nothing new. Strange words are not pleasing because they are not easily understood. Metaphors are pleasant because they quickly teach listeners something new. For example, when they hear old age called stubble they are informed quickly through the genus, for both these are things that have lost their bloom. But metaphors must not be superficial, that is, require no mental effort to understand. Metaphors like that make no impression on the listener and so are not pleasing.

There are four kinds of metaphor. The first kind consists in giving something the name of another thing of the same kind but more general; for example, “Your ship stands in the harbour”. Here the name of a general thing ‘standing’ is used in place of a specific thing ‘being at anchor’.

The second kind of metaphor consists in giving to something the name of another thing which is of the same kind but more specific; for example, “I’ve told him a thousand times”. Here the name of a specific number ‘a thousand’ is used in place of the general number ‘a great many’.

The third kind of metaphor consists in giving to one thing the name of another thing which is of a different kind altogether; for example, “John is a lion”. Here the name of a specific thing ‘lion’ is used in place of another specific thing ‘courageous man’.

The fourth kind of metaphor consists in giving to something the name of something else that is proportionate to it; for example, “He is in his evening”. Here ‘evening’ can be used in place of ‘old age’ because evening is proportionate to old age. The proportional metaphor is possible when there are four terms so related that the first is related to the second as the third is related to the fourth. In the example above, evening is related to day as old age is related to life, so we can metaphorically use the first in place of the third, or the third in place of the first: we can call old age evening, or call evening old age.

We can qualify this kind of metaphor if we wish, by adding that to which the word it replaces is relative, that is, the second or the fourth term. So we can call old age ‘the evening of life’, or we can call evening ‘the old age of the day’.

Metaphors may be qualified in another way. Having given something a metaphorical name, we then deny of it one of the attributes normally associated with the new name. For example, “He is a lion without teeth”.

Even if some of the four things have no special name of their own they can still be described metaphorically. For example, the action of throwing seed around is called sowing; the action of the sun throwing its flames out has no special name in common use, but it has been described metaphorically as ‘sowing flames’.

Metaphors should not be far-fetched, but when we give a name to something that has no proper name of its own we should derive the metaphor from things of the same genus or from things of the same species, so that the relationship is seen as soon as it is stated.

Metaphors should be derived from something that is beautiful in sound, or in signification, or to sight, or to some other sense, for it is in these things that the beauty or ugliness of a word consists.

If we wish to make our subject look better, we must derive our metaphor from the better species of a class. If we wish to make our subject look worse, we must derive our metaphor from the worse species. For example, we can choose whether we say a man has ‘made a mistake’ or has ‘committed a crime’. Both these things are species within the genus of wrongful actions, but the one is better and the other is worse.

Metaphors are especially pleasant if they set things before the listeners’ eyes. It is more pleasant to see something actually happening than to see only the result. We set things before the eyes when we use words that signify activity. For example, if we say that someone with all his faculties is ‘the full bottle’ we are using a metaphor, but not one that signifies activity; if we say ‘he is firing on all cylinders’ then we are expressing some activity. Even more active and lively is the metaphor that speaks of lifeless things as living. For example, ‘The arrow flew eagerly towards the crowd’ creates the impression of activity and life.

The most pleasing kind of metaphor is the one based on proportion, for example, “The youth that perished during the war disappeared from the country as if the year had lost its spring”.

Similes

Similes are like metaphors. There is little difference between them. If I say of a man, “He is a lion” it is a metaphor. But if I say, “He is like a lion” it is a simile. In both cases we consider that both the lion and the man are courageous, and we transfer the sense from one to the other. Similes can be made active the same way as metaphors.

Similes have much the same effect as metaphors because a simile is a metaphor with a word of comparison inserted. So if the simile is well constructed it is pleasant, but not as pleasant as a metaphor, because it is longer and it does not say that one thing is another, so the listener does not make an examination.

Similes are useful in prose and should be used like metaphors. But they should be used less frequently because there is something poetical about them.

Epithets

Epithets, like metaphors, may be applied from what is better or worse. For example, a man may be called ‘an investigator of corruption’ or an ‘invader of privacy’. But the epithet, like the metaphor, must be proportionate to the subject.

Diminutives

The use of diminutives comes to the same thing, because a diminutive makes what is good or bad appear less so. For example, calling a crime ‘a peccadillo’ makes it seem trivial. But again, we must take care that the diminutive is proportionate to the subject.

Hyperboles

Hyperboles also are metaphors, and they are pleasing. We can describe a man with a badly bruised face by saying, “His face is a basket of mulberries”. This is a metaphor because bruised eyes are something purple, and it is a hyperbole because of the great quantity expressed. We can do the same thing with a simile: “He is as slow as a snail”. There is something youthful about hyperboles because they show vehemence and are used by emotional speakers. Because of this they are not suitable for use by older speakers.

Enthymemes

Of the means of making listeners aware that they have learned something, the first is enthymemes. Enthymemes are pleasing to listeners provided that they are not superficial and provided that they are understood as soon as they are stated, or very soon after. Enthymemes that cannot be understood at all, and enthymemes that require no mental effort to grasp because they are superficial, are not pleasant, because nothing is learned from them. It is the content of an enthymeme that makes it pleasing.

Antithesis

Another means of making listeners aware that they have learned something is antithesis. Antithesis is a special kind of opposition in speech produced by bringing pairs of contraries close together. For example, “It often happens that wise men

fail while fools succeed”, in which ‘wise men’ and ‘fools’ are opposed, as are ‘fail’ and ‘succeed’.

The more concisely and antithetically the statement is expressed the more pleasing it will be. The reason is that antithesis is more instructive, and conciseness gives knowledge rapidly. But it is possible to have one quality without the other. On the one hand we could make an antithetical statement that is not concise: “Those who have a clear understanding of the nature of things are frequently the ones who are unable to succeed in their undertakings, while those who lack even the most elementary knowledge are the very ones who achieve what they set out to do”. On the other hand, we could make a concise statement that is not antithetical: “The wise have no title to success”. There is nothing particularly pleasant in either of these statements, but there will be if both conditions are fulfilled: “It often happens that wise men fail while fools succeed”.

Antithesis is instructive because contraries are easily understood when they are placed side by side. It is also pleasant because it resembles an enthymeme—refutation is made by bringing contraries together.

Witticisms

Most pleasure in speech is derived from metaphor, but it can also come from misleading the listeners beforehand by witticisms. For when the conclusion turns out contrary to his expectations, the listener sees more clearly that he has learned something, and this pleases him. He thinks, “How true, but I missed it”.

Sometimes this effect is produced by jokes that depend on a change of a word, for they are deceptive. Such puns are produced by perverting the meaning of a word instead of giving it its proper meaning.

Some surprises are produced when what follows is not in accordance with the listeners’ expectations. For example, “He strode on, upon his feet—blisters”. This does not finish as the listeners expect: they think the speaker is going to say something like ‘sandals’. This kind of joke must be clear the moment it is said.

Other witty sayings depend on meaning something other than what one says. These sayings also are misleading at first because the expressions are metaphorical and they teach us something. An example of this is the general’s remark, “You ought not be insolent lest your cicadas be forced to sing to themselves from the ground”, meaning that the population would be destroyed and the country devastated.

Artificial style

A frigid artificial style comes from four causes: using compound words, using uncommon words, using too many epithets, and using metaphors that are inappropriate.

Using compound words makes a speech too poetical and unnatural, for example, ‘end-accomplishing zeal’. Speakers use compound words when a thing has no name and the words are easy to combine, like ‘time-passing’.

Using uncommon words also makes a speech sound artificial. They elevate the style but in a way that makes the speech sound poetical.

Using many epithets is suitable for poetry but not for prose. It makes the art too obvious. Using poetic language makes prose speech ridiculous and artificial; and throwing many words at someone who already understands destroys clarity and produces obscurity. Yet epithets may be used in moderation to give speech a 'foreign air'.

Using inappropriate metaphors also produces a poetical style. Some metaphors are inappropriate because they are comical, some because they are too serious, and others because they are too far-fetched and obscure. These expressions fail to persuade.

38 Appropriate speech

To be persuasive, speech must be appropriate. An appropriate style will be obtained by expressing emotion and character, and by making the speech proportionate to the dignity of the subject.

Proportion

Speech will be proportionate to the dignity of the subject provided that the speaker neither treats important matters lightly nor treats unimportant matters gravely, but varies his language in accordance with the dignity of the subject.

To elevate our speech we can use a definition or description instead of a name. For instance, instead of saying 'democracy' say 'a state practising representative government by the people'. This elevates the speech because it lengthens it, and the length gives it dignity. To simplify the speech we should do the opposite and make it concise: use the name instead of the definition.

We should do the same thing to express anything shameful or indecent. If the indecency is in the name, use a description; if the description is indecent, use the name.

To elevate our speech we should also use metaphors and epithets to illustrate things, taking care to avoid anything poetical. To simplify our speech we should omit them. But when we use metaphors we must be careful to choose those that are appropriate by maintaining due proportion to the dignity of the subject. We must remember that some clothes suit a young man and others suit an old man. The same clothes do not suit both. If we fail in this regard our speech will sound inappropriate, because when opposites are placed next to one another they become most evident. For example, the statement, "He ruled his motor car" is inappropriate because the word 'ruled' exceeds the dignity of the motor car, and so the artifice can be seen.

Again, to elevate our speech, we should give each noun its own article, and avoid linking it up with others. For example, "...the beaches, the fields, and the streets..." To simplify the speech we do the reverse and omit them: "...the beaches, fields and streets..."

We should use connecting particles to elevate the style and omit them to simplify it. For example, "Having gone, and having spoken with him..." and the opposite, "Having gone, I spoke with him..." When we omit connecting particles we must be careful not to destroy the connection.

Emotion

Emotion will be expressed if the speaker, when speaking of outrage, speaks with anger; when speaking of noble things, speaks with admiration; when speaking of pitiable things, speaks with humility; and so on in all other cases.

The appropriate use of emotional language is one of the things that makes speech credible. The listeners know how others behave when things are as the speaker describes them, so if he acts the same way, they believe him, whether what he says is true or not.

Besides, listeners are always affected by a speaker who speaks with emotion, even when he really says nothing at all. This is why some speakers try to confuse their listeners with mere noise.

Compound words, epithets and unusual words are especially appropriate to an emotional speaker, because when a man is angered, for example, it is excusable for him to speak of “the most conscience-scarring crime in a crime-filled century”. He may do the same thing if it is his listeners who are strongly affected with emotion.

Listeners are also affected by another emotional device some speakers are fond of using: “Everybody knows...” or “Who does not know...?” Listeners agree because they fear to be seen to lack what is common knowledge.

These devices can be used and misused in all kinds of rhetoric. But when a speaker might be thought to go too far he should rebuke himself beforehand. Then his excess will seem genuine.

Moral character

Moral character is expressed by the style of speech because to each type of person—young, old, powerful, servile, confident, cowardly—there is an associated manner of speaking. An uneducated man will not say the same things in the same way as an educated man. So if a speaker uses language appropriate to a particular character, he will appear to have that character himself.

PART 4 – ARRANGEMENT

39 Arrangement

A speech has two parts: the statement of the case and the proof. Stating the case and then proving it is similar to stating a problem and then providing the solution. We don't do one without the other. And that is all we need have, except that in some circumstances we might add an introduction and a summary conclusion. So at most, the parts of a speech are four: introduction, statement of the case, proof and conclusion.

This does not mean that there will be only one of each of these parts in a speech, or that they will be used in only that order. An introduction naturally comes first in a speech, but as we shall see, some elements of an introduction might be needed later in a speech as well. A conclusion naturally comes last in a speech, but sections of a long speech might require conclusions which are then not final but intermediate. The remainder of a speech will be either statements of what is to be proved, or proofs of those things. In a very short speech there may be as few as one statement and one proof, but in most speeches there will be many of each.

Narrative and questions are not distinct parts of a speech but may appear in any of the four parts.

40 Introductions

In judicial speech

The usual introduction in judicial rhetoric begins the speech by providing a sample of the subject so that the listeners may know beforehand what the speech is about and not be held in suspense. What is undefined is easily lost. By putting the beginning into the listener's hand, as it were, we enable him to hold fast to it and follow the argument.

This is the only introduction needed if those spoken to are ready to listen and can judge rightly about what is said. But if they are not ready to listen, or if their judgment is poor and they are easily misled by things outside the case, we must use some other kind of introduction.

These other kinds of judicial introductions are remedies, and they are used to create goodwill or to arouse indignation, to engage or to distract the listeners' attention, or to remove prejudice against the speaker.

To create goodwill the speaker makes an appeal to the listeners by using methods of emotional persuasion that deal with friendship and pity, because it is with these feelings he must move the listeners. Similarly with indignation.

To gain the listeners' attention the speaker must convince them that the subject to be considered is important, astonishing, agreeable or concerns their own interests. It is to these things they pay attention. And while there might be some need to gain their attention at the beginning of a speech, there is even more need later on. Most listeners

pay attention at first to hear what the speaker has to offer and later on let their attention slacken. So engaging listeners' attention belongs to every part of a speech.

If the listeners are paying too much critical attention to the subject for the speaker's comfort, he may find it expedient to distract them. This is done by persuading them the subject is unimportant, or that it does not concern them, or that it is boring or painful. It can also be done simply by making them laugh.

In deliberative speech

Introductions for deliberative speeches are similar to those for judicial speeches. But they are not used very often because most listeners to a deliberative speech will know what the subject is and will not require an introduction. But if the subject is something the listeners are not acquainted with the speaker may have to begin by introducing it.

And an introduction might be needed on account of the speaker or his opponents or the listeners themselves if to the speaker's mind they attach too much or too little importance to the subject. So he may have to magnify or diminish the importance of the subject, or he may have to remove prejudice.

In display speech

Introductions for display speeches are like musical preludes played at a recital. The musician begins by playing whatever he can execute skilfully, and only then performs the main piece. So also is it with display speaking. The speaker should start off with anything he likes, no matter how remote or foreign it is to the rest of the speech. Then he connects this to the real subject and brings in the main theme.

Introductions for display speeches are drawn from praise and blame. The speaker must make the listeners believe they share the praise, either themselves or their families, or their profession, or in some other way. This should be easy, for as Socrates says, "It is not difficult to praise Athenians in the presence of Athenians".

Display introductions may also be derived from advice, that is, from persuasion and dissuasion.

If the subject of the speech is controversial or difficult or very commonplace, the speaker can gain indulgence by using appeals to the listeners, as in judicial introductions.

Such then are the reasons for introductions. They are used only with listeners whose judgment is poor and who are easily misled. Otherwise, they are used simply as a summary statement of the subject so that, like a body, the speech might have a head or have that ornament whose absence makes the speech seem offhand.

41 Prejudice

If an opponent tries to arouse prejudice against a speaker by bringing false accusations that are outside the case, the speaker must try to remove it before defending himself against the main accusation. There are several ways of handling prejudice.

One way is to contest the accusations directly. To do this we can:

1. Deny the fact.
2. Deny its harmfulness.
3. Deny harm to the victim, or so much harm.
4. Deny injustice, or so much injustice.
5. Deny moral wrong, or claim a balancing good: that although the act was injurious, it was honourable; or that it was painful but beneficial; or something of this kind.

Harmful suspicions can be handled in the same way as harmful accusations. It makes no difference whether the suspicion is expressed openly or not.

Another way to handle prejudice is to claim the action was not intentional. This can be done by showing that it was caused by error, misfortune, necessity or accident, that is, that the injury was not intended, but something else.

Another way is to show that the accusation has been answered satisfactorily at another hearing and that a favourable decision was given.

Another way is to attack slander and show what a great evil it is: it distracts attention from the truth, and it tries to make the case rest on things that have nothing to do with it. Incidentally, an accuser's use of slander shows he has little confidence in the merits of his own case.

Another way is to attack the accuser and show that he himself or someone close to him has been accused of the same thing, either now or formerly; or that he had accused others of the same thing and that subsequently they had been proved innocent; or that he is unworthy of belief in some other way. It would be absurd to accept the word of such a person.

42 Narrative

Narrative can be used in any part of a speech, but most often it is used as either a statement of what is to be proved, as in judicial speech, or as proof of something, as in both display speech and judicial speech.

In deliberative speech

Narrative is rarely used in deliberative speech because no one can narrate things to come. But we sometimes use narrative to remind our listeners of the past so that they may take better counsel for the future. This may be done with praise or with blame, but while we are doing that we are not functioning as a deliberative speaker.

In display speech

In display speech the narrative should not be consecutive but disjointed, that is, it should be introduced in several places and not all at the beginning of the speech. In display speech it has to be shown that the actions did take place (if they are hard to believe), or that they were of a certain kind and of a certain importance, or all three together. But a man is shown to be wise from some events and brave from other events, and so on, so if all these facts were narrated at the beginning, the speech

would be very complicated and difficult to remember. So it is simpler and better to narrate the facts a few at a time, as they are needed.

When praising well known people we recall only famous actions that everyone knows, so there is little need for narrative. But if we are praising someone who is not well known, narrative will be necessary because only a few people will know what he did.

In judicial speech

In accusation, the speaker must narrate all that will make the facts clear and convince the listeners that they happened, or that injury and wrong have been done, or that they are as important as he wishes to make them. If anything narrated seems incredible, he must give the reason for it at once. If he has no proofs, he must at least say that he is aware that what he says is incredible, but that he speaks the truth because it is his nature to do so.

In defence, the narrative need not be long. The points at issue are either that the alleged fact has not happened, or that it was neither injurious nor wrong, nor so important as is claimed; so we should not waste time on what all are agreed upon, unless the fact is admitted but something tends to prove it is not wrong. Past events likely to produce emotions unfavourable to the speaker should not be dwelt upon but mentioned only.

The judicial narrative should be of a moral character, and we can make it so if we know what brings this about. One thing to do is to make clear our moral purpose and not speak as if only from the intellect. A mathematical treatise, for example, coming from the intellect entirely, has no moral purpose and so has no moral character. But a statement like “I chose it as the better course even if I profited nothing by it”, indicates virtue and moral purpose.

Moral character can be indicated also by the peculiarities that accompany particular characters, so these should be included in the narrative. For example, “They laughed when they heard of his serious injuries” indicates their spite.

Introduce yourself and your adversary as being of certain characters so that the listeners will regard you and him as such; but do this unobtrusively. Then narrate anything that tends to show your own virtue or your opponent’s vice.

When speaking to show our own moral character we can make ourselves liable to a charge of jealousy, boasting or lying, and when speaking to show the moral character of another we may be accused of abuse or rudeness. So we must make someone else speak in our place, as if quoting their opinions.

The narrative should also include what is emotional by introducing the things that are well known to accompany the emotions, and also the things that are especially characteristic of yourself or your opponent. For example, “He slunk off, looking grimly at me” or, “He shook his fist violently at me”. These details are persuasive because, being known to the listeners, they become signs of what they do not know.

43 Proofs

We have studied the various kinds of proof a speaker has available and the topics where he may find them. We must now consider what the speaker may be required to prove, the kinds of proofs that should be used in the three kinds of rhetoric, and the manner in which they should be arranged.

In judicial speech

When accusing, we must convince the listeners that the accused is guilty because:

1. He voluntarily performed certain actions.
2. The actions were injurious.
3. The actions were unjust.
4. The injury and the injustices were serious.

When defending, we must convince the listeners that the accused is innocent because:

1. The alleged actions did not take place, or at least, not voluntarily, or
2. If they did take place, they were not injurious, or
3. If they were injurious, they were not unjust, and
4. If they were injurious or unjust, they were only slightly so.

The proofs should bear upon the particular points disputed: the fact, the injury, its seriousness, or its injustice. The last three points can be disputed as much as the fact, but if it is the fact that is in dispute, it must be established first before the others.

In judicial speeches, it is best to use enthymemes, because these speeches are concerned with the existence or non-existence of facts in which demonstration and necessary proofs are more in place, since the past involves a kind of necessity.

In display speech

When praising, we must convince the listeners that the subject of our speech is outstandingly noble or happy because:

1. His actions are outstandingly virtuous, or
2. His achievements are outstandingly good.

When blaming, we must convince the listeners that the subject of our speech is outstandingly disgraceful or unhappy because:

1. His actions are outstandingly vicious, or
2. His achievements are outstandingly evil.

Display speeches normally use amplification as proof because these speeches are concerned with actions which are not disputed, and we do not usually have to prove them; all that has to be done is to attribute nobility and greatness to them. We need to prove them only if the facts are incredible or if the actions have been attributed to the wrong person.

Display speeches should be varied with laudatory episodes that praise persons or things other than the principal subject of the speech.

In deliberative speech

When persuading, we must convince the listeners that they should do certain things because:

1. The advice we are offering them is expedient, that is, the action we are advising will be followed by certain consequences that are good for them.
2. Our advice is better than the advice offered by our opponents, or is better than might be thought.
3. Our advice is possible to carry out, and possible for them.

When dissuading, we must convince the listeners that they should not do certain things because:

1. The advice being offered is impossible in itself or for them to carry out.
2. The advice is evil or unjust in itself.
3. The advice will not be followed by the promised consequences, or else, if the consequences do follow, they will be evil, unjust, harmful or useless.
4. The advice and its consequences are even worse than might be thought, or not as good as is claimed.

In deliberative speech, proofs must be given of the particular points that are, or might be, in doubt. Not all things need be argued in every speech. What has to be argued depends on the circumstances. For example, if there is no doubt in anyone's mind about a certain course of action being possible, nothing can be gained by offering proofs that it is possible.

In deliberative speeches, it is best to use examples as proofs because these speeches are concerned with the future, and future things are best proved by examples taken from the past.

Using proofs

In both deliberative and judicial rhetoric, the speaker who goes first should usually state his own proofs first, then later refute the arguments he believes his opponent will use. But if there are several strong arguments against his own case, it is better to deal with each of them first, and having refuted them, state his own case.

The speaker replying should first answer his opponent's case, refuting and answering it by enthymemes, especially if his opponent's arguments have met with approval. Just as the listener's mind is ill-disposed against a speaker if his opponent raises prejudice against him beforehand, so it is equally ill-disposed against a speech if the opponent is thought to have spoken well. So we must make room in the listener's mind for the speech we intend to make, destroying the impression made by our opponent. We should state our own case only after we have counteracted all our opponent's arguments, or the most important of them, or the most plausible, or the weakest and easiest to destroy.

Enthymemes should not be used continuously in a series because they weaken one another. They should be mixed up with different kinds of proofs. Nor should enthymemes be sought for everything, otherwise we end up drawing conclusions that are better known or more plausible than the premises from which they are drawn.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative enthymemes because in refutative enthymemes opposites are brought close together and so the logical conclusion is the more striking. But we must remember that refutation is made partly by counter-enthymeme and partly by objection. We should also look to see whether our opponent makes any false statements about things outside the issue, because these look like evidence that he makes false statements about the issue itself as well.

An enthymeme should not be used when the speaker wishes to arouse an emotion. It will either drive out the emotion or it will be useless. Opposing movements cancel each other out by mutual weakening or destruction.

Nor should an enthymeme be used when the speaker wishes to give his speech an ethical character. A logical demonstration involves neither moral purpose nor moral character.

But moral maxims should be used in both narrative and proof to show moral character or to express emotion. For example, to show moral character: "I gave him the money even though I knew that one ought not to trust"; and to express emotion: "Although I have been wronged I do not regret it; his is the profit, mine is the right".

Sometimes it is useful to use jokes in arguments. If our opponent is serious, we can oppose him with jokes, but if it is our opponent who is joking, we should oppose him with seriousness.

So if we have enthymemes our language should be both logical and ethical, but if we have no enthymemes, ethical only. It is better for a virtuous man to show himself good than that his speech should be logically perfect. And even if he wanders from the point, this is better than being monotonous.

44 Questions

A good opportunity for asking a question is when one of the propositions of an argument is clear to all and it is obvious that our opponent will grant the other proposition if we ask him. But when we ask him for the second proposition and he grants it, we should not then ask for the first proposition that is obvious; rather, we should immediately state the conclusion.

Another good time to ask a question is when our opponent has made a false statement and suitable questions about a particular case will make the falseness clear. For example, he says, "All lawyers are lazy". We ask, "Is John lazy?" When he answers "No", we ask again, "How is this possible? John is a lawyer"

Another time to ask questions is when they will show that our opponent contradicts himself or what everyone else believes.

Another time to use questions is when our opponent can answer only with an evasive reply, such as, "Partly yes, and partly no". The listeners then see that he is in difficulties.

Except in these four situations we should not ask questions because if our opponent answers with an objection we appear to be defeated.

Unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our favour we should not put a conclusion in the form of a question, or ask a question after stating a conclusion.

If our opponent puts a conclusion in the form of a question we should give the reason for our answer. For example, “You admit you did the same thing as the others?” “Yes.” “Then should not you be punished the same way as they were?” “No, because they did it for money, while I acted according to my conscience.”

If our opponent asks an ambiguous question we should define the questions, but not too concisely, before answering them. If a question seems likely to make us appear to contradict ourselves, we should solve it at once in the answer before our opponent has time to ask the next question or to draw the unfavourable conclusion.

45 Conclusions

Conclusions have four parts:

1. To dispose the listeners favourably to the speaker and unfavourably to his opponent.
2. To amplify and diminish.
3. To arouse the listeners’ emotions.
4. To recapitulate.

Disposing the listeners

After the speaker has proved his case is true and his opponent’s false, he should praise himself and blame his opponent by showing that he is good and his opponent bad. These things can be done either simply or by comparing one to the other. Arguments for this are drawn from the topics of praise and blame.

Amplifying

Providing the facts of the case have been proved or admitted, the speaker should next deal with the question of degree by amplifying or diminishing. Topics for these have been given already.

Arousing the listeners

After the facts and their importance have been shown, the speaker should arouse the listeners’ feelings of pity, indignation, anger or hatred, and so on, so that they will decide and act in the manner the speaker intends they should. This is done according to the methods explained in the chapters on emotional persuasion.

Recapitulation

Recapitulation consists of a summary statement of the proofs. It can be done simply by recounting briefly what we said and why. Or we can make a comparison of what we said and what our opponent said, either point by point or without so direct a comparison. Or we can ask questions like, “What is there that I have not proved?” or, “What has my opponent proved?”

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ARISTOTLE. *The Art of Rhetoric*. tr. W. Rhys Roberts. Britannica Great Books. Chicago. 1952. English version only.

This translation is freer than John Freese's, providing a more readable but less precise rendering of the text. It is available at libraries in the series *Great Books of the Western World*, vol 9.

ARISTOTLE. *The Art of Rhetoric*. tr. Hugh Lawson-Trancred. Penguin Classics. London. 1991. English version only.

This is another free translation, providing greater readability by the use of contemporary language and better visual layout. It is readily available at major bookstores.

[ARISTOTLE]. *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. tr. H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge. 1965. Greek text with English translation.

This is almost certainly not Aristotle's, being far inferior to his *Art of Rhetoric*.

[CICERO]. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. tr. Harry Caplan. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge. 1964. Latin text with English translation.

This composition, probably not written by Cicero, concentrates on judicial rhetoric. However, it has a useful treatise on figures of speech in Book IV.

Glossary

- accident.* What can belong or not belong to a subject; a cause that acts otherwise than one intends.
- amplification.* An argument that shows that something is great or greater.
- antithesis.* A special kind of opposition in speech produced by bringing pairs of contraries close together.
- art.* Systematic rules for achieving what we intend.
- blame.* The opposite to *praise*.
- blessing.* Speech that sets forth a person's happiness by amplifying his good actions or his good achievements.
- circumstances.* Surrounding accidents, usually listed as answering the questions: who? what? when? where? how? why? with what?
- clause.* One member of a composite period.
- clincher.* See *necessary sign*.
- common topic.* A topic useful in more than one kind of rhetoric.
- comparison.* An example that uses an imaginary but credible particular case for a proof.
- conclusion.* That part of a logical argument supported by the premises; a summary part of a speech, either intermedial or final.
- confidence.* Absence of fear or doubt.
- congratulations.* See *blessing*.
- contradictory propositions.* Two propositions wherein what is affirmed in the one is denied in the other, e.g. "This water is cold"; "This water is not cold".
- contraries.* What cannot simultaneously coexist in the one subject, e.g. hot and cold.
- contrary propositions.* Propositions which separately affirm the existence of contraries in the same subject, e.g. "This water is hot"; "This water is cold".
- counter-enthymeme.* An enthymeme that proves the contrary of an opponent's conclusion.
- definition.* A phrase signifying the essence of a thing.
- deliberative rhetoric.* The kind of rhetoric used for persuading and dissuading by getting listeners to decide that something is expedient or harmful.
- depreciation.* The opposite to *amplification*.
- derivative.* A name taken from the name of something else, as *grammarian* from *grammar*.
- diminutive.* A name suggesting something little.
- discovered proof.* A proof that is worked out or invented by the speaker.
- display rhetoric.* The kind of rhetoric used for praising and blaming by convincing listeners that someone or something is noble or disgraceful.
- dissuade.* Convince listeners that a proposed course of action should not be taken.
- emotional proof.* Proof that depends on the speaker arousing certain emotions in the listeners to affect their judgment about the subject being discussed.

emotions. Affections of the mind that influence our opinions about the goodness or badness of things.

encomium. Speech that sets forth the greatness of a person's virtue by amplifying his good achievements.

enthymeme. A logical argument that uses signs or probabilities for premises.

epithet. A word signifying a characteristic quality.

equity. Justice that goes beyond the written law.

equivocation. Use of a word or phrase with more than one meaning.

example. A logical argument in which a less believable statement about one particular case is supported by a more believable statement about another and better known particular case of the same kind.

exhort. See *persuade*.

expedient. Useful action.

fable. An example consisting of an incredible imaginary story about people, animals or lifeless things.

false topic. A topic that is the source of a false argument.

general topic. A topic useful in any kind of rhetoric, providing arguments on any subject whatever.

happiness. An end or goal of life to attain which we choose or avoid other things.

historical example. An example taken from real life.

hyperbole. An exaggerated statement expressing strong feeling.

induction. A logical argument in which a general conclusion is supported by all or many of the individual instances.

invented proof. See *discovered proof*.

judicial rhetoric. The kind of rhetoric used for accusing and defending by getting listeners to decide that something was unjust or just.

logical proof. Proof that depends on the speaker showing the listeners what is true or apparently true about the subject; speech that makes the statement to be proved clearer and more credible.

maxim. A wise saying; a general statement about the objects of human conduct and what should be chosen or avoided in relation to them.

metaphor. A word that properly belongs to one thing used as the name of another.

moral proof. Proof that depends on the speaker speaking in such a manner as to make the listeners have confidence in his moral character and believe what he says.

necessary sign. A sign that can flow from and point to one cause only.

noble. That which is desirable for its own sake and at the same time worthy of praise; that which is good and pleasant because it is good.

objection. A statement that is contrary to an opponent's proof statement.

opinion. A proposition assented to with fear that the contradictory proposition is true.

parable. An example consisting of an imaginary but credible story about people.

paradox. An opinion that contradicts general opinion; a seemingly self contradictory statement.

period. A portion of speech that makes complete sense, has a beginning and an end

- clearly marked by the rhythm of the words, and has a length that allows it to be easily understood.
- persuade*. Convince listeners that something is so or that a proposed course of action should be taken.
- praise*. Speech that sets forth the greatness of a person's virtue by amplifying his good actions.
- premise*. A supporting proof statement in a logical argument.
- probability*. A statement about all or none of something, referring to what is generally known to happen or not to happen, to be or not to be. It does not have to be true without exception.
- proof*. Something that gives listeners confidence in what the speaker says.
- real proof*. Proof existing independently of the speaker's invention; not provided by the speaker.
- refutation*. An argument that shows that an opponent's argument is either false or improbable.
- sign*. A statement about something that is easily perceived that points to something else.
- simile*. A metaphor that compares one thing to another.
- syllogism*. A logical argument in which the statement to be proved follows necessarily from other statements that are assumed to be true.
- topic*. An element of an argument; a general proposition underlying an argument; a place in which proofs may be found or from which proofs may be derived.

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